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action, and are not parties to the appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In June 1997, Plaintiff-Appellee Bill Ercanbrack and his wife Tammy bought a 
manufactured home from Defendant-Appellant Oakwood.1 Oakwood built the home at 
its plant in Fort Morgan, Colorado, and trucked it to the Ercanbracks' property near Coal-
ville, where it installed the home. R. 7005:74. The Ercanbrack family moved into the 
home in September 1997. R. 7001:61. On January 31, 1998, a propane explosion com-
pletely destroyed the home and killed Tammy, Bill's seven-year-old daughter Tina, and 
Bill's eighteen-month-old son Jeremy. R. 7001:17, 20. 
A. Mr. Ercanbrack Discovers the Explosion. 
On January 31, 1998, Mr. Ercanbrack planned to meet his wife and children in 
Coalville at approximately 4:00 p.m., after he completed work, to do the family shopping. 
R. 7001:88-89. When the family did not meet him on time, he started driving towards his 
home, expecting to find the family with some car trouble along the road. R. 7001:90-91. 
He did not encounter them along the roadway, however, and when he approached his 
home site he saw that his house was gone and yellow lines were on the snow leading up 
to his home site. R. 7001:91-93. In his panic, Mr. Ercanbrack mistook these for police 
"do not cross" lines and turned around and headed to a phone to contact the Sheriffs 
1
 The home was built by Defendant-Appellant Homes by Oakwood, Inc., and sold by 
Defendant-Appellant Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc. This brief refers to the two entities 
collectively as "Oakwood." 
Office. R. 7001:92-93. Mr. Ercanbrack telephoned the Sheriffs Office at approximately 
5:05 p.m. R. 7001:91-96; R. 7004:39-40. The police informed him that no explosion had 
been reported. R. 7001:96. He immediately sped back to the home site. R. 7001:96. 
When he reached what was left of his home, Mr. Ercanbrack discovered that the 
yellow lines were actually insulation thrown from the explosion. R. 7001:96. He first 
discovered Tammy's body lying some distance away from the actual home site. R. 
7001:96-97. She was without any clothes except for underpants, and her lower torso was 
burned a bright red. R. 7001:97-98. He took off his jacket and covered his wife and 
immediately began searching the wreckage to locate his children. R. 7001:97-98. He 
next discovered Tina's body in the midst of the wreckage of the home. R. 7001:98. 
At about that time, Summit County police and others began arriving at the site. R. 
7001:101. Mr. Ercanbrack and the others searched to locate Jeremy, but despite every-
one's efforts, they were unable to locate the boy, and the search was eventually called off 
because of darkness. R. 7001:101-103. One officer then volunteered to remain at the site 
to secure the scene overnight and to ward off any animals. R. 7004:42-43; R. 7003:167. 
The next morning the search began again. R. 7001:106. After some time, the pol-
ice brought a search dog to the site, which eventually located the body. R. 7004:43-44. 
The body was charred beyond any recognition. R. 7001:107; R. 7003:171. 
B. Investigation and Analysis of the Explosion. 
Richard Thatcher, an experienced propane accident investigator, was at the Ercan-
brack scene three days after the explosion and examined all aspects of the scene, includ-
ing the gas pipes. R. 7006:24, 59, 87. He soon determined (and Oakwood's experts 
agreed) that the explosion was caused by propane gas, which accumulated in the crawl 
space underneath the living area. R. 7011:195, 114;R. 7006:38;R. 7007:184. 
The "external" portion of the home's propane system consisted of a fuel tank, lines 
connecting that tank to a "second stage regulator" outside the home, and lines running 
from the second stage regulator to an inlet connection at the wall of the crawl space. R. 
7006:59-61. The "internal" portion of the system consisted of two horizontal supply 
pipes that ran from the inlet through the home's crawl space, about 17 inches below the 
floor level, and connected to two "risers," vertical pipes extending up through the floor 
that connected the horizontal pipes with the stove and furnace in the home. See Pipe and 
Fracture Diagram, Def.'s Tr. Ex. 237, Addendum Exhibit ("Add. Ex.") 1 hereto. One 
horizontal pipe ran straight from the inlet and connected to the furnace riser by a "T" 
joint; the second went out ninety degrees from the first pipe and connected to the range 
riser by an elbow joint. At the inlet the horizontal pipe was strapped to a stabilizing 
block to hold the pipe assembly rigid. The regulator and surrounding connections were 
covered by a plywood box to keep snow off the regulator. R. 7006:102-103; R. 
7011:216. Oakwood manufactured the internal pipes, connections, and risers, from the 
inlet block in, but not the external portion. 
All of the internal horizontal pipes, connections, and risers were recovered after 
the explosion. R. 7004:132-134. All external lines were recovered except for a threaded 
ring that was screwed into the second stage regulator. R 7011:50, 207. The system had 
broken in four places: (1) in the base threads of the range riser, (2) in the horizontal pipe, 
at an elbow joint just in from the range risers, (3) in the base threads of the furnace riser, 
and (4) outside, in the regulator box, where the second stage regulator connected to a gas 
line. See Add. Ex. 1; R. 7010:85. The fourth break was the only one not in the crawl 
space. R. 7011:195-96. The regulator itself was melted. R. 7006:93. 
The recovered gas pipe was pressure tested and contained no leaks, other than at 
the four fracture points (except for small leaks at two joints, which everyone agreed did 
not leak enough gas to cause the explosion). Oakwood Br. at 32; R. 6998:158-59, 168. 
From prior experience and testing, Mr. Thatcher believed the propane leak occurred in 
the crawl space. R. 7006:102. Mr. Thatcher believed that if the explosion had been 
caused by a leak in the regulator box, the fireball from the explosion would have 
damaged items near the box, which did not happen. R. 7006:99-100. Mr. Thatcher also 
concluded from his experience and observations that the propane would not have 
migrated from a leak in the regulator box into the enclosed crawl space in sufficient 
quantities to have caused an explosion. R. 7006:99-102. 
Mr. Thatcher set out to test this conclusion through scientific testing. He and his 
associates built a smaller version of the Ercanbrack structure. They excavated, poured 
footings, built cinderblocks, and applied stucco and other similar features, with a sim-
ulated living area. During the tests the wind and snow conditions were recreated. R. 
7006:103-132. Tests were run on the exemplar by releasing propane at the point of the 
outside break for several hours at the highest rate possible, representing the worst-case 
scenario leak that could occur. R. 7006:137-139. Thatcher in his 50+ years of exper-
ience in the industry has never encountered a residential propane leak as large as the 
amount released for the tests. R. 7006:137; R. 7005:204. The propane was monitored at 
various locations in and around the crawl space. R. 7006:113, 135-136, 139-140. After 
running the tests and reviewing all data, Thatcher again concluded that a leak in the 
regulator box could not have caused the Ercanbrack explosion, because not enough gas 
could migrate into the crawl space to reach an explosive concentration. R. 7006:146. 
Joseph Romig, Ph.D., who has been a gas explosion expert for over twenty years, 
also ran tests relating to the possibility of an outside leak and reviewed all evidence and 
reports in the case. R. 7007:97-101. Dr. Romig also ran multiple worst-case scenario 
tests releasing propane into the regulator box and collecting data in and around the test 
crawl space. R. 7007:97-101. After reviewing data and releasing his conclusions, Dr. 
Romig ran subsequent gas migration tests in an effort to address and answer questions 
raised by Oakwood's experts regarding the previous migration testing. R. 7007:161. As 
a result of examining the evidence, performing other related tests, and reviewing that 
data, Dr. Romig concluded, "I don't see any way that gas from outside - from leaking 
within that [regulator] box could account for this incident." R. 7007:180. 
Franklin Alex, Ph.D., examined the evidence to determine whether the source of 
the leak in the crawl space could be located. Dr. Alex has been a physical metallurgist 
for over forty years and specializes in failure analysis. R. 7007:232. Dr. Alex started his 
analysis by relying on the expert conclusions that (1) the accumulation of gas was in the 
crawl space, and (2) the propane in the crawl space could not have come from a leak 
outside the crawl space. R. 7008:15-16; 85-86; 101. Dr. Alex and Mr. Thatcher ob-
served that the only source of propane in the crawl space was the Oakwood gas pipe. R. 
7006:38; 7008:15. (Oakwood has never contended otherwise.) Therefore, Dr. Alex 
concluded that the leak must have come from the pipe located within the crawl space. R. 
7008:15, 16. Since the recovered pipe revealed no leaks in the crawl space except at the 
three fracture points, the propane leak for the explosion could only have originated from 
one of these three points. R. 7008:15-16; R. 6998:71-73, 76-77. 
It is standard practice in failure analysis that once the possibilities have been nar-
rowed, testing would occur to try to determine the failure. This testing may or may not 
involve examination of fracture surfaces. R. 6998:70-73, 77; R. 7007:233; R. 7008:26-
27, 35. Since the leak had to have come from one of the three breaks in the crawl space, 
Dr. Alex inspected those fracture surfaces and concluded that each of the pipes was 
fractured by bending forces. R. 7008:21. Dr. Alex also reviewed the fracture surface at 
the outside fracture point. R. 7008:20. The half of the fracture surface that was 
recovered was too corroded to inspect with a scanning electronic microscope ("SEM"). 
R. 7008:20-21. The only conclusion that could be reached from studying the outside pipe 
fracture surface is that that break also occurred from bending forces. R. 7008:20. 
Dr. Alex next used his mechanical engineering background to study the pipe itself 
and its assembly and construction. R. 7007:233; R. 6998:84. Dr. Alex familiarized 
himself with Oakwood's manufacturing process by reviewing the depositions of 
Oakwood employees, Julie Meek, Larry Webber, Richard Gibson, and others, who 
worked at Oakwood's Colorado plant. R. 6998:126, 128-129; R. 7007:278. Dr. Alex 
also reviewed the deposition of Michael Slifka, Oakwood's HUD expert. R. 6998:129. 
Dr. Alex reviewed a videotape Oakwood prepared showing Oakwood's processes for gas 
pipe construction, installation, and testing.2 R. 6998:125, 128-129, 131-132; R. 
7008:234-238, 317-322. Dr. Alex also inspected a similar home at the Oakwood lot. R. 
6998:133. 
Dr. Alex's inspection revealed that every single pipe connection Oakwood manu-
factured violated American National Standards Institute's ("ANSI") standard B 1.20.1, 
which governs threading and connection of gas pipes, and which is incorporated into the 
HUD standards for manufactured homes. R. 7008:38-43, 49-50, 67. B 1.20.1 requires 
that the pipes used in the home have only 10-11 threads on a connection end, and that a 
pipe be inserted only 7-8 threads into a joint, with 3 threads remaining outside the joint. 
R. 7007:8. The pipes Oakwood manufactured all had 14 threads, and all connections in 
the horizontal pipes were/«//y inserted, i.e., inserted 14 turns, with no threads visible. R. 
7008:38-48. The range riser, however, was underinserted into the joint at its base: The 
pipe was inserted only 5 to 6 threads, with 8 threads visible, thus significantly weakening 
that joint 7008:38-48. 
Dr. Alex recognized that the combination of overthreading and overinsertion had 
two negative effects on the pipe assembly. First, the overthreading and overinsertion 
Even though Oakwood prepared the videotape for the litigation, Oakwood sub-
sequently moved the trial court to exclude the video. The trial court granted the motion 
in part, even though Richard Gibson, who had seen the video, testified in his deposition 
that the procedures depicted in the video were the same as the procedures used in manu-
facturing the Ercanbrack home. R. 6998:123, 124, 131, 132; R. 7008:234-238, 317-322. 
Because the video was clearly the type of material that an expert would reasonably rely 
on, Dr. Alex should have been allowed to testify regarding the video at trial under Utah 
R. Evid. 703. Further, that Dr. Alex consulted the video, as well as the other sources 
discussed in the text, refutes Oakwood's claim that Dr. Alex supposedly failed to perform 
a proper investigation or otherwise lacked foundation for his opinions. 
caused the overall length of the horizontal pipe assembly to be shortened.3 R:7008:41-
42, 49-50. Second, the overinsertion caused the joints to be so highly "torqued" that they 
were impossible to adjust, thus making the entire assembly more rigid and less able to 
absorb or dissipate any stresses placed on the assembly. R. 7008:49-50. 
Dr. Alex concluded that due to the shortening of the assembly caused by the over-
threading and underinsertion, the range riser connection and the furnace riser connection 
were 1.3 inches closer together than they should have been. R. 7008:51. The holes in the 
floor through which the risers passed, however, had been drilled before the risers were in-
stalled or inserted. R. 7004:153-55; R. 7008:36-37. Dr. Alex thus concluded that the 
distance between the furnace and range riser pipes was 1.3 inches shorter than the 
distance between the holes drilled in the floor to accommodate those pipes, causing a 
misalignment between the riser bases and the riser holes. R. 7008:54-55. 
Dr. Alex then recognized that during construction of the home, the risers and pipe 
assembly would likely have to be forced to make both risers fit through the holes (R. 
7008:54-55), and conducted tests to determine what force would be necessary to accom-
plish such a maneuver. Dr. Alex determined that if the pipe assembly was fixed at only 
one point, i.e., at one riser insertion, the force necessary to insert the other riser would be 
twelve pounds (at 17 inches from the end of the riser pipe, which was the distance 
3
 When pipe is threaded and inserted in accordance with B 1.20.1, there would be 8 
thread-widths of "overlap" between the pipe and the joint, i.e., 8 threads would be inside 
the joint at full assembly. But Oakwood placed 14 threads on the end of each pipe and 
rotated them until no threads were visible, i.e, so there were 14 thread-widths of overlap. 
Each overthreaded-overinserted connection was thus 6 thread-widths shorter than a 
properly threaded and inserted connection. See R. 7008:131-32. 
between the base of the range riser and the floor of the home). R. 7008:57-59. If, how-
ever, the system was fixed at two points, e.g., at the other riser and at the inlet block 
where the pipe enters the crawl space, the force necessary to fit the risers, measured 17 
inches from the base of the riser, would be approximately 80 to 100 pounds. R. 7008:59. 
Further, Dr. Alex also found that when the risers were forced and adjusted to fit 
the originally drilled floor holes, the range riser would tilt away from the furnace riser 
and would lean at an angle into where a wall would eventually be built. R. 6998:114-
117, 118, 132; R. 7008:52-54, 153-158. Oakwood's inspector Richard Gibson testified 
that the range riser often was not vertical after installation. R. 7004:159. Therefore, to 
install the wall, the range riser must be forced and straightened to a vertical position. 
Julie Meek testified that as far as she knew, the range riser was vertical at final inspec-
tion, indicating the Ercanbrack riser was forced vertical at some point during con-
struction. R. 7008:62-64. 
As stated above, Dr. Alex discovered that the range riser was overthreaded and 
underimerted into its elbow joint. Instead of being inserted for eight threads as B 1.20.1 
requires, the riser pipe was inserted into the elbow joint only five to six threads. R. 
7008:41-42. This significantly weakens the joint, because a thinner section of the tapered 
pipe wall is exposed to the high stress area of the joint. R. 7008:42. Dr. Alex conducted 
tests to determine the difference in joint strength caused by an overthreaded and under-
inserted pipe and found that an overthreaded-underinserted joint is much weaker: a 
properly inserted pipe failed at 108 pounds of force, while the overthreaded-underinserted 
pipe failed at 80 pounds. R. 7008:43-45. 
Dr. Alex knew that with the mild, ductile steel used in the pipes, failure from 
bending can result in a crack in the pipe which does not extend entirely through the pipe 
wall. R. 7008:64-65. In this scenario, the gas pipe would have already failed, yet the 
pipe would pass a leak test because the pipe would still be gas tight until the fracture 
worked all the way through. R. 7008:64, 68. Once a partial crack existed, a small 
amount of additional movement of the riser would cause the crack to extend completely 
through the pipe wall. R. 7008:65. Dr. Alex concluded that outside temperature changes 
at the Ercanbrack home could cause sufficient movement in the pipe to cause a partial 
crack in the range riser wall to extend through the entire wall. R. 7008:65. Dr. Alex also 
concluded that there would be no metallurgical fracture surface evidence that this partial 
pre-crack existed before the leak. R. 7008:26, 31-35. 
Dr. Alex identified several events during the manufacturing process that were 
likely to cause such a fracture to the base of the weakened, underinserted range riser. For 
example, based on the load tests explained above, Dr. Alex believed that the force re-
quired to move the risers and pipe assembly to let the risers fit through the floor holes 
would be enough to cause such a fracture. R. 7008:62. Dr. Alex also concluded that the 
bending force used to straighten the Ercanbrack riser back to vertical after it leaned 
through the floor hole was also sufficient to cause the pipe to fail. R. 7008:154-55. Dr. 
Alex also noted that impact to the riser during installation of the walls could cause 
enough force to partially fracture the pipe; because the range riser was 41 inches long, a 
force of 33 pounds at the end of the pipe would put the same stress on the pipe as a 70-
pound force at 17 inches. R. 7008:63-64. Dr. Alex further concluded that a fracture 
could result from transportation of the unit. R. 7008:64. 
Dr. Alex determined one other way in which a fractured pipe could initially pass 
pressure tests but later develop a leak. Dr. Alex observed, during his inspection of the 
range riser, that the pipe was covered by a "copious amount" of pipe dope at the base. R. 
7008:164-65. Dr. Alex noted that the pipe dope could have temporarily sealed the gas 
pipe for the pressure tests and eventually allow the crack to leak propane. R. 6998:75-76. 
C. The Litigation. 
Mr. Ercanbrack sued Oakwood, SS Supply Company (which had supplied the pro-
pane4), and other defendants, stating claims for negligence, strict liability, and breach of 
the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability. R. 416-441. He settled with all 
defendants except Oakwood. Oakwood maintained that the propane leaked from either 
the second stage regulator or the connection to that regulator, and that the propane must 
have migrated out of the plywood regulator box, under the snow, and through a vent in 
the crawl space wall. See, e ^ , R. 7000:62-63; R. 7011:181, 186, 208, 210, 195-196. 
Oakwood also asserted that its personnel would not manipulate pipes if risers were mis-
aligned, but instead would drill a new hole in the floor. R. 7000:43-44. Before trial, 
Oakwood filed a motion in limine to exclude "Dr. Alex's testimony concerning caus-
ation." R. 3771-3861. The trial court conducted a Rimmasch hearing, at which Dr. Alex 
testified and was examined by counsel for Oakwood and for Mr. Ercanbrack. 
4
 Mr. Ercanbrack's claim against SS Supply was based on the fact that the odorant 
included with the propane had faded, so that Mr. Ercanbrack and his family were unable 
to smell the propane leak. Mr. Ercanbrack contended that the odorant faded because SS 
Supply furnished a rusty tank, and it is well known that rust neutralizes the odorant. 
R. 6998:54-152. Dr. Alex explained the basis for his opinions concerning how the 
improper threading and insertion of the horizontal pipes could have led to the explosion. 
Judge Hilder asked numerous questions and ultimately denied the motion. See R. 
6998:152. Judge Hilder ruled, however, that if the only evidence at trial established that 
Oakwood drilled a new hole in the floor for the misaligned riser instead of manipulating 
the pipe assembly, Dr. Alex's testimony might be stricken.5 IdL 
At trial, Mr. Ercanbrack explained the circumstances of the explosion. Among 
other things, he explained that he had shoveled the snow away from the regulator box and 
the vents on the Sunday before the accident, and that it had not snowed at the site during 
that week. R. 7001:50-54, 76. 
Mr. Thatcher, Dr. Romig, and Dr. Alex all testified and presented the opinions set 
forth above. Significantly, Dr. Alex presented his opinion concerning the possible 
locations of the leak, the likelihood that the pipe assembly was manipulated to align the 
risers, the forces required for such manipulation, and the effect such forces could have on 
the weakened riser, with little objection from Oakwood. See infra. Further, in response 
to points raised by Oakwood's experts, Dr. Alex offered additional opinions. In response 
to Mr. Moore's testimony that he did not find any "arrest marks"6 on the pipe recovered 
from the explosion, Dr. Alex explained that the pipe was made from a mild steel that 
5
 The trial court indicated, however, that evidence that went only to Oakwood's claimed 
customs and practices would not be sufficient to exclude Dr. Alex's testimony: "I'm 
worried about general practice." R. 6998:142. 
6
 An "arrest mark" is a mark indicating that a crack developed to a certain point, and 
then stopped. 
would not yield such marks. R. 7008:26-27; R. 7011:231. Dr. Alex also testified, based 
on his years of experience, that an SEM examination would not have been either 
appropriate or necessary for this particular fracture analysis, because corrosion and 
damage on the pipe surfaces would interfere with such an examination and because the 
fracture scenario would not leave evidence that would show up on an SEM. R. 7008:26-
27; R. 7011:231-32. Finally, Dr. Alex recounted an experiment he conducted wherein he 
partially broke several pipes, let them sit for six months, and then broke them the rest of 
way; examination of those surfaces with the SEM confirmed that no arrest marks were 
visible. R. 7008:31-35. Dr. Alex testified that his theory of causation was consistent 
with fracture mechanics and metallurgy. R. 7008:66. 
Mr. Ercanbrack also introduced deposition testimony from Oakwood employee 
Richard Gibson, who was the Oakwood line inspector when the Ercanbrack home was 
built. Mr. Gibson's deposition testimony explained that when the unit arrived at the ass-
embly station to have the risers inserted, the horizontal pipe was already strapped to the 
inlet block, to keep the gas line "rigid." R. 7004:156; R. 7008:174. Mr. Gibson testified 
that he worked on approximately 10,000 homes during his time at Oakwood, and that the 
risers were off from vertical five to ten percent of the time ("often enough that we knew 
it happened"). R. 7004:158-59, 165. Yet Mr. Gibson could recall only one time when a 
new hole was drilled to accommodate the misalignment. R. 7004:155. (Later at trial, Mr. 
Gibson said that he could recall 20-30 times when riser holes were redrilled and covered. 
R. 7008:212.) Moreover, Mr. Gibson admitted that sometimes when risers were mis-
aligned, Oakwood personnel would manipulate the pipe assembly to make the risers fit. 
R. 7004:158. Mr. Gibson claimed, however, that Oakwood personnel only would "jig-
gle" the pipes. Id. This admission is itself quite damning, because Mr. Slifka testified 
that when risers are not vertical, the only permissible correction HUD allows is to drill 
new holes in the floor. R. 7009:148. 
Finally, Mr. Ercanbrack referenced the quality-control document, or "traveler," 
that accompanied the Ercanbrack home through the manufacturing process. See Trav-
eler, Defs.' Tr. Exs. 207(a) and (b), Add. Ex. 2 hereto. The traveler's purpose is to doc-
ument significant events during the manufacturing process, and the traveler form 
specifically directs Oakwood's employees to "list all non-conformances." IcL The trav-
eler for the Ercanbrack unit lists things like "blocks for gas unit installed by #10," "hole 
in kitchen ceiling panel needs changed, re staple ceiling diaphragm," and "switch in 
closet panel change." IdL But the traveler did not say that a new riser hole was drilled or 
that the inlet pipe was ever unblocked or reblocked. 
At the close of Mr. Ercanbrack's case, Oakwood moved for a directed verdict, 
which the trial court heard and denied two days later. R. 7008:168; R. 7011:5-17. In the 
meantime, Oakwood presented its case, including expert witness testimony. David 
Moore testified that he did not believe manipulation of the pipes would have fractured a 
riser, and that he could find no physical evidence of such a pre-explosion fracture. R. 
7011:68-69; 94-95. Based primarily on his inability to find physical evidence (even 
though Dr. Alex had testified that such evidence would not exist), Mr. Moore leapt to the 
conclusion that the leak probably occurred at the outside fracture (R. 7011:159), though 
his examination of that surface did not yield anything. R. 7011:66-68. 
John Freeman testified, based on Mr. Moore's opinion that propane probably did 
not leak from the crawl space, that propane could have leaked at the regulator or the 
regulator box fracture point and migrated under snow into the crawl space vents. R. 
7011:186. Freeman admitted, however, that he had no evidence of a leak in the regulator 
box and was unaware of any event that would have caused such a leak. R. 7011:208. 
Finally, Michael Slifka stated that compliance with ANSI B 1.20.1 was not required by 
HUD regulations, though he admitted that a manufacturer cannot "ignore" B 1.20.1. R. 
7010:10,28-29,43-44,51. 
Oakwood never produced the persons who installed the risers for the Ercanbrack 
unit, so there was no direct evidence as to what actually occurred. Instead, Oakwood 
merely asserted that its practice was to drill a new hole and cover the old hole with tin if 
the pipe did not align with the riser holes. See Oakwood Br. at 28-29. 
Importantly, Oakwood witnesses corroborated or failed to dispute many of Dr. 
Alex's conclusions. For example, Oakwood stipulated that the connecting pipes were 
overthreaded by three threads. R. 7000:41-42; R. 7011:240. Oakwood also did not 
contest that the horizontal pipes were folly inserted into their connections or that the 
effect of the overthreading and overinsertion was to shorten the riser distance by 1.3 
inches. Nor did Oakwood dispute that the range riser was under'mserted into its elbow 
joint. In fact, both Mr. Gibson and Larry Webber, a Colorado HUD inspector at Oak-
wood when the home was built, testified that the 7 to 8 threads showing in the range riser 
were unacceptable; Mr. Gibson would have required rethreading if he had seen it before 
it left the Oakwood plant. R. 7004:151-152, 205-07; R. 7008:301-302, 308-309. 
Mr. Moore, Oakwood's metallurgy expert, confirmed that an underinserted pipe 
connection would be significantly weaker than a properly inserted connection. 
R. 7011:78-85, 126-127. Mr. Moore also confirmed that it was possible to achieve a 
partial thicloiess crack in a pipe by bending it. R. 7010:135. In fact, Mr. Moore testified 
to a series of experiments that ended up confirming Dr. Alex's opinion that the force 
required to make a riser pipe line up with the predrilled hole would be enough to partially 
crack the pipe. R. 7011:78-85. Mr. Moore testified that he made four attempts to bend 
the pipe, two with proper insertion and two with overthreading-overinsertion, and that in 
three of those four attempts, he was able to achieve a crack that did not extend through 
the entire wall thickness. R. 7011:135. The only pipe that did not fracture was properly 
threaded and inserted. R. 7011:135-136, 139. 
Importantly, Mr. Moore was able to obtain these partial fractures at deflections of 
as low as 1.5 to 1.65 inches, which is nearly identical to the 1.3 inch misalignment that 
Dr. Alex calculated. R. 7011:82-85, 136-137, 139. Further, Mr. Moore obtained frac-
tures with forces of 85 to 90 pounds (id.), which are consistent with the forces Dr. Alex 
said would be required to align the risers if the assembly was rigid. R. 7011:31. 
Mr. Moore also admitted that a partial thickness fracture that later developed into a 
full crack would not necessarily leave discernable metallurgical evidence on the fracture 
surface. R. 7011:156. Finally, Mr. Moore acknowledged that a partial fracture could 
grow to a full fracture with as little as 1/20" movement, and that expansion and 
contraction at the Ercanbrack home could account for over 1/20" relative movement in 
the gas pipe. R. 7011:119-120, 139-140. 
In his opening statement, Oakwood's trial counsel told the jury that it was con-
clusively established that, while Mr. Ercanbrack was the first to report the explosion, he 
did not report the explosion until 6:05 p.m. R. 7000:61. Counsel stated, "I don't know 
what he did, but there is a lot of time unaccounted for." Id. The deposition testimony 
obtained by Oakwood prior to trial, however, showed that Mr. Ercanbrack reported the 
explosion at approximately 5:05 p.m. - not at 6:05. Ercanbrack Dep. at 52-56, 142, Add. 
Ex. 3. Mr. Ercanbrack had testified as to the sequence of events - that he left Coalville at 
4:30 p.m., drove 11 miles in 20 minutes, arrived at the scene of the explosion at 4:50 
p.m., immediately dashed to find a telephone, and called the Sheriffs Office from a 
neighbor's house, clearly only a few minutes after arriving at the scene. Id. From its 
deposition of Fire Investigator Lynn B. Borg, Oakwood had also elicited testimony that 
Mr. Ercanbrack reported the explosion at "1705" - 5:05 p.m. Borg Dep. at 24-25, Add. 
Ex. 4. And Investigator Borg's Report of Investigation, introduced at his deposition, also 
stated repeatedly that Mr. Ercanbrack reported the explosion at "1705." Add. Ex. 5. 
After deposing Mr. Ercanbrack and Investigator Borg, Oakwood served a set of 
Requests for Admission, which included the following two responses by Mr. Ercanbrack: 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12: Admit that you reported the 
explosion to the Summit County Sheriff at 6:05 p.m. on January 31, 1998 
as recorded in the Summit County Sheriff LAW Incident Table (a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit 2). 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 13: Admit that approximately 50 
minutes elapsed between the time you discovered the explosion and the 
time you reported the explosion to the Summit County Sheriffs Office. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 13: Deny. 
At trial, Oakwood sought to introduce Admission No. 12 to support its claim that 
Mr. Ercanbrack did not report the explosion until 6:05 p.m. Oakwood also attempted to 
exclude evidence that contradicted its reading of the admission. The court admitted both 
admissions and allowed evidence as to the actual time of the call, ruling that the court's 
"fundamental purpose here is to give the jury the whole picture." R. 6997:30. 
During the trial, Oakwood did not object to testimony showing that Mr. Ercan-
brack reported the explosion at 5:05 p.m. R. 7001:92-96. Oakwood itself even elicited 
such evidence on cross-examination of Mr. Ercanbrack. R. 7003:90-96, 107-09. Oak-
wood also did not object to testimony from Sheriffs officers and Blaine Ercanbrack to 
the effect that the Sheriffs Report was incorrectly logged at 6:05, and the correct time 
would have been 5:05. Kg,, R. 7004:39-40; R. 7003:157; R. 7007:257-58. Additionally, 
Oakwood put into evidence Investigator Borg's Report of Investigation, recording that 
Mr. Ercanbrack reported the explosion at "1705." Defs' Tr. Ex. 294, Add. Ex. 5. 
Ultimately, both sides rested their cases, and Oakwood did not renew its motion 
for a directed verdict. See R. 7011:241. Instead, the case went to the jury. The jury was 
instructed that Mr. Ercanbrack and SS Supply had reached a settlement agreement. The 
trial court further instructed that the jury must still determine from the evidence which 
party or parties were at fault, and the percentage of fault that each party contributed in 
causing the damage. Additionally, the court instructed the jury that Mr. Ercanbrack now 
had a financial interest in showing that the parties that did not settle were entirely to 
blame for the accident and damages. The trial court did not disclose to the jury the 
amount paid in the settlement with SS Supply. 
The jury returned a verdict determining that Oakwood was 60 percent liable for 
the accident and finding that Mr. Ercanbrack had incurred $8,953,600 in damages. 
Judgment was entered against Oakwood for $5,259,638.40. The jury determined that SS 
Supply was 40 percent liable for the accident. Forty percent of $8,953,600 is $3,581,440, 
very close to what SS Supply had previously paid in settlement ($3.25 million). Ten days 
later, Oakwood moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial, 
which was denied. This appeal followed. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah R. Civ. P. 36(b), 50(b); Utah R. Evid. 103(a), 702, 703. See Add. Exs. 6 
through 10. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court and the jury did exactly as they were supposed to. Judge Hilder 
carefully and appropriately exercised his discretion in response to Oakwood's evidentiary 
and procedural objections, and the jury carefully weighed the conflicting evidence. 
Oakwood's dissatisfaction with the verdict does not mean error occurred. 
Oakwood's claim that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Frank Alex's testimony 
fails for several reasons. First, Oakwood's challenge is improper because Oakwood fails 
to identify the particular statements or opinions that supposedly should have been ex-
cluded. Oakwood's challenge to Dr. Alex's "story" is not sufficient to enable Mr. Ercan-
brack to respond or the Court to rule. Second, Oakwood's challenge based on Rimmasch 
fails because Dr. Alex's testimony was not based on novel principles or techniques, and 
there is no good reason to extend Rimmasch. Third, Oakwood waived most of its ob-
jections by not presenting them at trial. Fourth, Oakwood's arguments fail on the merits 
because there was ample foundation for the opinions Dr. Alex expressed at trial, and the 
testimony was helpful to the jury in assessing whether the explosion was caused by a 
defect in the home. Oakwood's main complaint is that Dr. Alex and its own experts 
reached different conclusions, but that is not ground for striking evidence. 
Oakwood's attack on the jury verdict should be rejected as well. Once again, Oak-
wood failed to preserve its objections by failing to move for a directed verdict at the close 
of the evidence and by failing to marshal the evidence on appeal. Oakwood's challenge 
fails on the merits as well, as the jury's determination that the explosion was caused by a 
defect in the home is supported by the evidence. The jury was well within its rights in 
relying on the direct and circumstantial evidence showing a defect and how the defect led 
to the result, particularly since Mr. Ercanbrack's evidence refuted the only alternative 
explanation Oakwood offered for how and why the accident occurred. 
Oakwood's other challenges, based on the alleged misconduct of plaintiff s coun-
sel during closing argument and alleged error on the part of Judge Hilder, are after-the-
fact, makeweight arguments to compensate for the fact that Oakwood has no legitimate 
basis for appeal. First, the court did not err in allowing both Mr. Ercanbrack's admission 
to Request No. 12 and other evidence to explain the admission. Oakwood unreasonably 
relied on the admission in representing to the jury that there was a lot of time un-
accounted for, insinuating impropriety on the part of Mr. Ercanbrack during that time. 
The admission was poorly drafted by Oakwood, and evidence from pre-trial discovery 
was overwhelming that Mr. Ercanbrack reported the explosion at 5:05 p.m. - not 6:05. 
The court's ruling, indicating that "my fundamental purpose here is to give the jury the 
whole picture/5 was a proper exercise of discretion, particularly when the challenged 
evidence was elicited by Oakwood itself, and when the only relevance of the timing of 
the report was to create a fictitious gap of time, so Oakwood could imply impropriety 
from that fiction. 
Second, the trial court properly exercised its sound discretion in dealing with the 
arguments of both counsel, and the arguments of plaintiff s counsel were not improper or 
prejudicial. The argument referencing "send a message" was urged in the context of 
ultimate liability, and was not inviting the jury to "respond in damages." Any prejudice 
was cured through court instruction and the explanation of plaintiff s counsel that he was 
not asking the jury to punish Oakwood. The argument that there were applicable 
standards that imposed a legal duty on Oakwood was not an improper comment on the 
merits of the case. Oakwood's claim of prejudice from reference to Oakwood as a large, 
out-of-state corporation is unfairly based on mischaracterizations of counsel's argument 
and of the context in which the argument was made. Finally, Mr. Ercanbrack's counsel 
did not improperly argue credibility in responding to Oakwood's direct accusation that 
Mr. Ercanbrack was lying. The response was confined to the record and was not based 
on the personal knowledge of Mr. Ercanbrack's counsel. 
Third, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury that SS Supply was a 
proximate cause of the injuries, or as to the amount SS Supply paid to settle with Mr. 
Ercanbrack. Indeed, the jury expressly found that SS Supply was a proximate cause and 
appropriately apportioned fault. While disclosing the fact of settlement to the jury was 
proper, it would have been improper to disclose the amount of the settlement. 
Finally, as the Court will see in analyzing the various alleged errors and mis-
conduct asserted by Oakwood, this is not a case in which the accumulation of error 
amounts to a determination that Oakwood did not receive a fair trial. Oakwood was 
"entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one, for there are no perfect trials." McDonough 
Power Equipment Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 552 (1984). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ADMIT-
TING DR. ALEX'S EXPERT TESTIMONY. 
The trial court acted well within its discretion in allowing Mr. Ercanbrack to 
present expert opinion testimony from Dr. Frank Alex. Dr. Alex is a highly qualified 
metallurgist who has been specializing in the field of failure analysis for nearly forty 
years. Dr. Alex visually and microscopically examined the pipe recovered from the 
Ercanbrack home, consulted manufacturing standards, made mathematical calculations, 
performed various re-enactment tests, read and analyzed depositions of Oakwood em-
ployees, viewed a videotape of Oakwood's manufacturing process, and went to a sales lot 
to examine a similar home. In reliance on these sources and on his own knowledge and 
experience in metallurgical failure analysis, Dr. Alex concluded that Oakwood defec-
tively threaded and inserted the pipes comprising the home's propane system, and that 
these defects most likely led to the explosion. 
Under Rule 702, "Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge" is 
admissible if it will "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact 
in issue." Utah R. Evid. 702. Expert testimony is generally admissible where "'the 
subject matter is not one of common observation or knowledge, or in other words, where 
witnesses because of particular knowledge are competent to reach an intelligent 
conclusion and inexperienced persons are likely to prove incapable of forming a correct 
judgment without skilled assistance.'" Patev v. Lainhart, 1999 UT 31, If 22, 977 P.2d 
1193 (citation omitted). If expert testimony is based on "novel scientific principles or 
techniques," the proponent of such evidence must show that those principles or 
techniques are "inherently reliable." See State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 396-98 (Utah 
1989). But if the testimony is not based on novel principles or techniques, the proponent 
need only show that there is an adequate foundation for the expert's opinions. See Patev 
at ^ 2 0 , 23. 
"A trial court has considerable discretion in determining whether expert testimony 
is admissible." State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added). "Con-
sequently, absent a clear abuse of this discretion, an appellate court will not reverse the 
trial court's determination." State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, f 11, 1 P.3d 546. 
A. Oakwood's failure to specify the testimony that it believes should have 
been stricken precludes consideration of its argument 
While Oakwood claims that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Alex to testify, 
Oakwood never specified, either below or on appeal, precisely which portions of Dr. 
Alex's testimony are objectionable. Oakwood raises one specific objection, that Dr. Alex 
should not have testified that the leak was at one of the fracture points in the crawl space. 
Otherwise, Oakwood merely complains about "Dr. Alex's opinion regarding causation," 
"Dr. Alex's testimony/' or "Dr. Alex's story." See R. 3771-3861; Oakwood Br. at 27. 
But Dr. Alex testified for over 240 transcript pages (R. 7007:227-299; R. 7008:5-169; R. 
7011:228-235) and gave several opinions that related to "causation." Oakwood cannot 
seriously contend that everything he said is inadmissible. 
An appellant may not complain about an evidentiary ruling unless he made a 
"specific" objection. Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1). A general objection fails to satisfy this 
requirement. See, e.g., Redevelopment Agency v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 475 50 (Utah 1974) 
("Defendants' generalized objections directed to the entire deposition do not comport 
with the requirements of [the rule]."). The Court should therefore disregard Oakwood's 
challenge to the admissibility of Dr. Alex's testimony. 
B. The trial court properly allowed Dr. Alex to testify that the leak must 
have been located at one of the three fracture points in the crawl space. 
The Court should reject Oakwood's attack on Dr. Alex's testimony that the pro-
pane leak was located at one of the three fracture points in the pipes under the home. 
Contrary to Oakwood's claim, there is nothing "speculative" about Dr. Alex's conclusion 
that the propane leak occurred at one of the three fracture points. Instead, Dr. Alex's 
opinion is soundly based on Mr. Thatcher's and Dr. Romig's testimony that established 
that the propane leak was in the crawl space. 
As explained in the Statement of Facts, the evidence was undisputed that the ex-
plosion involved propane gas that had accumulated in the crawl space.7 Because all of 
the pipe was recovered and tested, everyone agreed that except for the four places where 
the pipe was broken (one in the regulator box outside, and three in the crawl space), there 
were no other breaches in the propane system that could have leaked enough to cause an 
explosion. R. 6998:158-63. Therefore, everyone agreed that the leak that caused the 
explosion had to come from one of the four fracture points. But Mr. Thatcher and Dr. 
Romig both testified that the outside leak could not have caused the explosion. R. 
7006:146; R. 7007:180. Significantly, Oakwood does not challenge the admissibility of 
either Mr. Thatchers or Dr. Romig's testimony. 
Because Mr. Thatcher and Dr. Romig conclusively eliminated a leak in the reg-
ulator box as a source, the leak had to be at one of the three fracture points in the crawl 
space. There was no other choice: "Number one, we know we had gas under the trailer 
that caused an explosion. Okay, number two, assuming the gas came from a source 
under the trailer 100 percent had to be one of the three broken pipes." R. 7008:15. 
Therefore, Dr. Alex did not make a "speculative leap" or "turn[] scientific analysis 
on its head." Oakwood Br. at 22, 26. Dr. Alex merely started with reasoned conclusions 
furnished by experts in the field of propane explosions and gas migration - conclusions 
that Oakwood does not attack — and took them one logical step further based on his own 
knowledge and experience as a failure analyst. And Oakwood's witnesses did not 
Because it is undisputed that propane from the home's internal or external propane 
system exploded, Oakwood's argument that "statistically" most propane systems are 
reliable is absurd. Oakwood Br. at 26. 
disagree with Dr. Alex's reasoning: They did not suggest another possible source of the 
leak other than the fracture points, nor did they dispute that if the gas did not migrate 
from the regulator box, the leak must have been at one of the three fracture points in the 
crawl space. In fact, Oakwood's migration expert John Freeman used the same reason-
ing, concluding that if the leak were outside, it "had to be" in the regulator box, because 
there were no other breaches outside. R. 7011:195-96. 
1. Dr. Alex's testimony is not inadmissible under Rimmasch 
because Rimmasch does not apply. 
As noted above, Rimmasch applies only to scientific testimony based on "novel 
o 
scientific principles and techniques." See Patey f 16, 977 P.2d at 1196. Oakwood does 
not claim that Dr. Alex's testimony was based on novel principles or techniques. Having 
failed to even address this important prerequisite for the application of Rimmasch, it is 
improper for Oakwood to ask this Court to reverse on the basis of Rimmasch. Moreover, 
Dr. Alex's testimony regarding the possible locations for the leak is not based on novel or 
untested scientific principles, but on the opinions of other experts and his own substantial 
knowledge and experience. One expert may rely upon another in formulating his or her 
opinions, and there is no claim that those other opinions were inadequately supported. 
See Patey % 32 (it was proper for one dentist to relay the causation opinions obtained 
from other experts); Lanham v. Idaho Power Co., 943 P.2d 12, 919 (Idaho 1997) ("The 
trial court may, in its discretion, permit an expert to render an opinion based in part on 
8
 See also State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, \ 19, 1 P.3d 546; State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42, 
H 16, 5 P.3d 642; Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, \ 27, 29 P.3d 638; Alder v. Bayer Corp., 
2002 UT 115, ffif 58-59, 61 P.3d 1068. 
facts or opinions provided by others.") Oakwood agrees. R. 6998:139. 
Finally, Dr. Alex's testimony is not "novel" simply because he used "differential 
diagnosis." Oakwood claims that such reasoning "has been uniformly criticized and rej-
ected by courts" (Oakwood Br. at 26), but Oakwood fails to note that this Court has 
squarely held that differential diagnosis "is one of the oldest and most widely used and 
recognized of all the methods." Alder v. Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115, f 62, 61 P.3d 1068. 
In Alder, the Court recognized that differential diagnosis has been held to be "'presump-
tively admissible'" and "does 'not even implicate Rimmasch, much less violate its 
requirements.'" Id. fflf 63, 66 (citations omitted). 
2. Dr. Alex's testimony satisfies Rule 702's foundation and 
reliability requirements. 
Because Rimmasch does not apply, Dr. Alex's testimony need only satisfy Rule 
702's requirement that his opinions have an adequate foundation. See Patey ffif 22-23, 
977 P.2d at 1198. "'The expertise of the witness, his degree of familiarity with the nec-
essary facts, and the logical nexus between his opinion and the facts adduced must be 
established.'" Id. Tj 23 (quotation omitted). 
a. Oakwood has waived any objection under tra-
ditional Rule 702 standards. 
Oakwood does not claim on appeal that Dr. Alex's testimony fails to meet the 
traditional, non-Rimmasch, foundational requirements. Thus, Oakwood has waived any 
argument that Dr. Alex's testimony was inadmissible under those standards. 
Further, Oakwood did not object when Dr. Alex testified that the leak had to be at 
one of the three fracture points. See R. 7008:15-16, Add. Ex. 11 hereto. (Oakwood did 
object when he restated his conclusion later.) Oakwood's pretrial Rimmasch motion was 
insufficient to preserve an objection based on the foundation for a particular opinion 
under Utah's traditional standard, because Rimmasch addresses only the principles and 
methods underlying an expert's opinions, not the testimony itself. See, e.g., Adams f^ 16, 
5 P.3d at 647 (emphasis added) (refusing to apply Rimmasch because "Rimmasch simply 
requires that the scientific principles underlying the expert's testimony be inherently 
reliable, not that the expert's actual testimony be inherently reliable''). 
Had Oakwood made & foundational objection at trial, Mr. Ercanbrack could have 
asked Dr. Alex additional questions to cure any problem. But Oakwood remained silent. 
Mr. Ercanbrack would be prejudiced if Oakwood were allowed to object now. 
b. Dr. Alex's testimony was supported by an 
adequate foundation. 
Finally, Dr. Alex's testimony concerning the location of the leak was supported by 
a proper foundation: Mr. Thatcher's and Dr. Romig's unchallenged expert testimony and 
analysis that the leak was in the crawl space and that there was no other place in the 
propane system from which the propane could have leaked. 
Oakwood's arguments largely miss the point. For example, Oakwood suggests 
that Dr. Alex improperly failed to consider alternatives, but the only possible locations 
for the leak were the four fracture points, and Thatcher and Romig eliminated outside 
sources as possible causes. In other words, the record does not reveal any other "possible 
sources" for the leak.9 
Oakwood suggests that Mr. Thatcher did not identify or eliminate possible 
sources of the leak within the home (Oakwood Br. at 21), but this is a specious argument 
because no one suggested at trial that the leak could have been inside the home. Oak-
wood did not claim that propane leaked from within the home, but rather that the propane 
leaked at the regulator box (and then migrated out of the box, under snow, through a vent, 
and into the crawl space). R. 7011:159, 181, 186, 195-96, 208, 210. Even Oakwood's 
gas expert testified that only small amounts of propane were in the living area, and that 
this gas had migrated from the crawl space due to a thermal "stack effect" that drew air 
up, not the other way around. R. 7011:188, 196, 216-217. Finally, Oakwood cites no 
evidence in the record that a leak in the living area actually could have caused the 
explosion, i.e., that gas leaking inside the home could have migrated into the crawl space 
and accumulated enough to explode. Therefore, Oakwood has no basis to suggest that 
anyone wrongly failed to "eliminate" a source within the home. 
Oakwood's experts did not dispute that if the leak occurred in the crawl space, it 
had to have occurred at one of the three fracture points there. Moreover, any disagree-
9
 Oakwood's cases are distinguishable. In Stibbs v. MAPCO, 945 F. Supp. 1220, 1224-
25 (S.D. Iowa 1996), the plaintiffs experts theorized that a propane explosion was 
caused by a faulty control valve on a water heater, but post-accident testing revealed no 
leak in the valve and the experts acknowledged that they could not rule out the furnace as 
a possible source of the leak. Similarly, in Indiana Michigan Power Co. v. Runge, 717 
N.E.2d 216, 232-38 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), the plaintiffs sued a utility for various symp-
toms they claim were caused by power lines, and they attempted to establish causation 
through experts who had no medical degrees, had not examined the plaintiffs or reviewed 
their records, and who failed to consider that the symptoms at issue, i.e., rashes, 
headaches, tooth decay, and a miscarriage, could be caused by countless other things. 
ment with Dr. Alex's opinions would go "to the weight to be given the expert's tes-
timony, not to its admissibility." Green If 28, 29 P.3d at 646. Thus, the trial court did not 
err in allowing Dr. Alex to testify as to the possible locations for the leak.10 
3. Rimmasch should not be extended. 
The Court should decline Oakwood's request to extend Rimmasch to cover the 
present case. This Court has repeatedly reiterated that Rimmasch applies only to tes-
timony based on novel principles or techniques. As noted in section 1(B)(1) above, this 
Court has held at least five times that Rimmasch does not apply to testimony not derived 
from novel scientific principles. 
Rimmasch need not be extended to ensure that expert testimony satisfy "certain 
threshold reliability standards." Oakwood Br. at 45. Patey makes clear that even non-
novel expert testimony must be supported by a proper foundation, including a connection 
between the opinion and the supporting facts. See Patey <f 23, 977 P.2d at 1198. If ex-
pert testimony is "unreliable," there will be no logical connection between the opinion 
and the factual basis, and such evidence can be excluded on that basis. 
Oakwood does not suggest that the Court was wrong in refusing to extend Rim-
Finally, Oakwood misleads the Court when it suggests that a "cause and origin expert" 
used "Dr. Alex's methodology" as a "text book example of faulty reasoning." Oakwood 
Br. at 25 (quoting Randall Noon, Engineering Analysis of Fires and Explosions at 3). In 
the Noon hypothetical, the only fact known is that an explosion occurred in a room 
containing a propane furnace, and the question is whether it is appropriate to conclude 
that propane exploded. Noon points out that such a conclusion may not be proper if there 
is another plausible cause of the explosion. See id. at 3-5. In the present case, however, 
there is no other plausible cause of the explosion, because everyone agrees the explosive 
substance was propane that came either from the regulator box fracture point or from one 
of the fracture points in the crawl space. 
masch to non-novel evidence, that conditions have changed, or that the refusal to extend 
Rimmasch has harmed Utah courts. Instead, Oakwood wants Rimmasch extended simply 
because Oakwood dislikes the outcome of the present case. 
4. Dr. Alex's testimony satisfies any additional require-
ments under Rimmasch. 
Finally, Dr. Alex's testimony concerning the locations for the leak would be 
admissible under Rimmasch. Even though Rimmasch did not apply, Judge Hilder did 
conduct an extensive Rimmasch hearing, at which Dr. Alex testified and the parties ar-
gued all issues surrounding the admissibility of Dr. Alex's opinions. R. 6998:54-152. 
The trial court considered the arguments carefully and correctly concluded that, as long 
as there was evidence that the gas could not have migrated from the regulator box into the 
crawl space, Dr. Alex would be allowed to testify that the leak had to come from one of 
the three crawl space fracture points. R. 6998:147, 152. 
The trial court acted well within its discretion. Most importantly, Dr. Alex's rea-
soning that the leak had to come from one of the crawl space fracture points, based on 
Mr. Thatcher's and Dr. Romig's opinions, is perfectly sound. Dr. Alex testified that he 
reviewed those opinions based on his own scientific background and agreed with their 
reasoning. R. 6998:72. 
Oakwood's failure to challenge Mr. Thatcher's and Dr. Romig's testimony is fatal 
to Oakwood's attempt to challenge the admissibility of Dr. Alex's testimony on the pos-
sible sources of the leak, as Oakwood is really complaining about Thatcher and Romig's 
opinions. Thatcher and Romig determined that the leak had to come from the crawl 
space and that the system was gas tight everywhere except the fracture points. The jury 
obviously believed those witnesses, whose opinions must be taken as true for purposes of 
this appeal. See, e ^ , Water & Energy Sys. Tech. v. Keil 2002 UT 32, f 15, 48 P.3d 888 
(court will "view all evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to that verdict"). 
The established methods and principles Dr. Alex used to conclude that the leak 
came from one of three fracture points in the crawl space meet any requirement of 
"reliability" imposed by Rimmasch or any other authority. The trial court therefore did 
not abuse its discretion in allowing Dr. Alex to present that opinion. 
C. The trial court properly allowed Dr. Alex to explain how Oakwood's 
improper threading and insertion of gas pipes likely led to the leak. 
Oakwood apparently claims that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Alex to testify 
that the leak most likely occurred at the base of the range riser and was most likely 
caused by Oakwood's improper threading and insertion of the pipes that made up the 
propane system. Once again, Oakwood's argument lacks merit. 
1. Dr. Alex's testimony was proper. 
The subjects of Dr. Alex's testimony, including the proper threading and insertion 
of gas pipe connections, the effects of improper threading and insertion, the effects of 
certain bending forces on Schedule 40 pipe, the forces at which such pipe may partially 
or fully fracture, the mechanisms by which a partial fracture may develop into a full frac-
ture, and the reasons why a fracture may not be manifest for months are well beyond 
"common observation [and] knowledge," Patey ^22, 977 P.2d at 1198, and Dr. Alex 
clearly has specialized knowledge that "will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence [and] to determine a fact in issue." Therefore, his testimony is proper. 
Further, Dr. Alex established an adequate foundation for his opinions. As ex-
plained in the Statement of Facts, Dr. Alex relied on his decades of experience in failure 
analysis, direct examination of the recovered pipe, reference to the standards governing 
pipe threading and insertion, visual and microscopic examination of the fracture surfaces, 
experimental testing, depositions of Oakwood employees, a videotape of Oakwood 
manufacturing processes, examination of a home similar to the Ercanbrack home, and his 
general knowledge of the properties of Schedule 40 pipe. The trial court carefully 
considered Dr. Alex's foundation and testimony, and Oakwood's objections, and 
concluded that Rule 702 allowed Dr. Alex's testimony. Oakwood has given no reason to 
believe that Judge Hilder abused his discretion in so ruling. 
2. Oakwood's challenges to Dr. Alex's testimony lack merit. 
a. Testimony Regarding Manipulation of the Pipe Assembly. 
Oakwood has not established, and cannot establish, that the trial court exceeded its 
ample discretion in allowing Dr. Alex to testify about the likely manipulation of the risers 
and pipe assembly and the effects that such manipulation would have on the range riser. 
i. Oakwood failed to object at trial. 
First, Oakwood waived any objection by failing to object to the testimony at trial. 
In response to Oakwood's motion in limine, the trial court ruled that Dr. Alex would be 
allowed to testify, but his testimony might subsequently be stricken if Oakwood estab-
lished that new holes were actually drilled to accommodate the misalignment. See Oak-
wood Br. at 28 (quoting R. 6998:150-52). But Oakwood never followed up at trial 
Instead, Dr. Alex testified, without objection, that when the risers were misaligned by 1.3 
inches, "You could force it to fit... [b]y actually pulling it" and "[0]ne of the things you 
could do is you could actually take and pull a pipe so far that you could put enough on 
the force so it breaks." See R. 7008:54, 63. Oakwood also failed to object to Dr. Alex's 
testimony concerning the forces involved in pulling the pipe over or the effect that those 
forces would have on the range riser. See R. 7008:58-66. 
An objection must be made at trial unless the trial court "makes a definitive ruling 
on the record admitting or excluding evidence." Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(2). As shown by 
the quotation in Oakwood's brief, the denial of the motion in limine "at this time" clearly 
was not "definitive"; the ruling expressly contemplated a further objection based on 
evidence of Oakwood's manufacturing processes, which never came. Cfi Scott v. Ross, 
140 F.3d 1275, 1285 (9th Cir. 1998) (where trial court denied motion in limine but 
indicated it would consider subsequent objections, party's failure to object waived right 
to challenge admission). 
Mr. Ercanbrack would be severely prejudiced if the Court were to consider Oak-
wood's belated challenge. Had Oakwood objected at trial, Mr. Ercanbrack could have 
presented any additional foundational or corroborating evidence that was required. 
Accordingly, Oakwood should not be allowed to challenge that testimony now. 
ii. Oakwood's arguments fail on the merits. 
Oakwood's challenge appears to be based entirely on Rimmasch, but Oakwood 
has not established, or even claimed, that Dr. Alex's testimony was based on novel prin-
ciples or techniques, and as such Rimmasch does not apply. In fact, Mr. Moore agreed 
that failure analysis is not "complex or difficult." R. 7010:7-11. Similarly, Oakwood has 
not asserted that Dr. Alex's testimony fails to satisfy the traditional Rule 702 require-
ments. Oakwood thus cannot show that Rule 702 bars Dr. Alex's testimony. Cf. State v. 
Rugebregt, 965 P.2d 518, 524 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (challenge under Rimmasch not suf-
ficient to raise challenge under Rule 702). 
Oakwood's primary complaint appears to be that Dr. Alex's testimony was 
"directly contrary" to Oakwood's testimony that instead of manipulating the pipe assem-
bly to align the risers, Oakwood "would" redrill the floor hole and release the pipe assem-
bly from the inlet block to accommodate any manipulation of the assembly. No one from 
Oakwood testified to redrilling a floor hole or unblocking the gas assembly; instead, Oak-
wood relied on testimony about its purported "general practices." 
There is no basis, under Rimmasch or Rule 702, for Oakwood's contention that 
Dr. Alex's testimony is inadmissible. First, Oakwood's position that its after-the-fact 
testimony about general practices not tied to the Ercanbrack home requires the exclusion 
of Dr. Alex's testimony is absurd on its face. If Oakwood were correct, then a litigant 
could always bar adverse expert testimony simply by testifying that its general practice 
was to do everything properly. For example, suppose that in a vehicle accident case, the 
plaintiffs expert concludes that the defendant's vehicle was speeding. The driver of the 
other car is killed, and his employer claims that its standard practice is for its employees 
to obey the speed limit. It is obvious that in such a situation, the plaintiffs expert would 
be allowed to testify as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence, and it would be up to 
the jury to determine whether the driver was speeding. The same analysis applies here. 
Oakwood claims that expert testimony may be excluded where that testimony con-
tradicts "indisputable" facts in the record. Oakwood Br. at 32. But that principle, to the 
extent it is even valid, does not apply here, because it is certainly not "indisputable" that 
Oakwood drilled a new hole in the floor of the Ercanbrack home to remedy the mis-
alignment between the risers and the floor holes. 
Indeed, there is no evidence that Oakwood drilled a new hole; to the contrary, 
there is evidence that Oakwood did not drill a new hole. Because no one remembers 
building the Ercanbrack home, the best source of evidence as to its construction is the 
"traveler," on which Oakwood employees were to "list all non-conformances." Traveler, 
Add. Ex. 2. The traveler for the Ercanbrack unit lists trivialities like "blocks for gas unit 
installed by #10," "hole in kitchen ceiling panel needs changed, re staple ceiling dia-
phragm," and "switch in closet panel change." Id. But even though trivialities like these 
are listed on the traveler, nothing on the traveler indicates that the hole for the range 
riser was redrilled on the Ercanbrack unit. Id. 
To drill a new hole, someone would have to measure, locate, and drill the new 
hole. The person would have to drill through the linoleum floor that was installed after 
the holes were originally drilled, and a piece of tin would have to be cut and inserted into 
the old hole.11 R. 7008:182. Oakwood employee Richard Gibson testified that redrilling 
While Mr. Gibson tested the gas line and inspected the riser, he never claimed to have 
seen tin covering the old riser hole. R. 7008:185, 211, 213, 222, 227. Similarly, there is 
no evidence that John Bailey of Summit Propane saw tin in the floor when he moved the 
was exceedingly rare; he could recall only one instance when it happened (later changed 
to 20-30 out of 10,000 homes). R. 7004:155; R. 7008:212. And yet, despite the rarity of 
the event, not a single Oakwood employee documented that a new hole was drilled. 
Likewise, there is no evidence that the home's gas line was ever unstrapped from 
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the inlet block to accommodate any such manipulation. The traveler does not indicate 
that the pipe was ever released from the inlet block or subsequently reattached to the 
block, even though the traveler reflects the initial blockins of the gas pipe: "Blocks for 
gas line installed by #10."13 R. 7008:241. Given that the traveler reflects the initial 
blocking of the gas line, it is reasonable to conclude that the traveler would have reflected 
any unblocking or reblocking of the line had it occurred. 
Because the traveler does not even suggest that a new hole was drilled to accom-
modate the misaligned risers, or that the pipe assembly was unstrapped from the block to 
stove and capped the riser to conduct a pressure test after hookup. R. 7004:20-21, 29. 
And no piece of tin was found at the scene of the explosion. 
It is misleading for Oakwood to claim that the pipe is "only secured by flexible straps 
and it can be moved." (Oakwood Br. at 30). As Oakwood's own witnesses explained, 
when the unit came to the riser insertion station, the pipe was strapped to a wooden block, 
which held the pipe "rigid." R. 7004:156; R. 7008:174. 
Moreover, even if the gas line were unblocked at the input, the distance between the 
risers still would not match up with the distance between the predrilled floor holes, so 
that forces would still need to be placed on the risers and gas assembly to make the risers 
fit, and the misalignment of the risers with the floor holes would result in constant stress 
on the gas pipe assembly during transportation and occupancy. 
Also, any testimony by Oakwood concerning the "flexibility" of the system is suspect 
because of the overthreading and overinsertion of the horizontal pipes. As Dr. Alex 
testified, Oakwood's practice of threading the pipes fully into the joints, instead of 
leaving a number of threads showing as required by ANSI B 1.20.1, resulted in the gas 
pipe assembly being less flexible. See R. 7008:49-50. 
facilitate any manipulation of the assembly, it is reasonable to conclude that no such 
actions occurred. Cf. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R. Co., 
615 F.2d 4705 477 (8th Cir. 1980) (absence of record showing inspection and cleaning of 
cars was evidence that inspection and cleaning did not happen). 
Further, while Oakwood claims that its standard practice was to redrill holes, tes-
timony by Oakwood employees demonstrates that this is not necessarily so. For exam-
ple, Oakwood admits that its employees sometimes "jiggle" riser pipes to make them fit 
instead of drilling new holes. Oakwood Br. at 28. It is a fine line between "jiggling" a 
pipe and forcing a pipe. Further, Oakwood admits that its employees are allowed to 
move pipes up to half an inch when pipes are misaligned. R. 7004:158. It would there-
fore not be surprising if an employee moved a pipe 1.3 inches, i.e., only 0.8 inches over 
the "allowed" distance. Finally, Richard Gibson testified that even though pipes were 
misaligned five to ten percent of the time, new holes were rarely drilled. R. 7004:155, 
158-59, 165. 
Oakwood also has not shown that it is indisputable that its employees always 
followed its alleged procedures regarding misalignment of risers. There are times when 
following procedures will be time consuming or difficult, and a line employee, like 
anyone else, may decide to take a "shortcut." Indeed, Mr. Slifka testified that the assem-
bly line required the work at each station to be completed within 20 minutes (R. 
7009:156-57), so it is perfectly believable that an assembler may have decided to simply 
pull the pipe assembly roughly an inch-and-a-half to insert the risers instead of stopping 
the installation, measuring, and drilling a new hole. 
In fact, the underinsertion of the range riser shows that Oakwood's quality control 
procedures are not always followed: Two Oakwood employees testified that having eight 
threads showing above a joint was "unacceptable," and that the joint should have been 
caught and fixed before the home went out. R. 7004:151-152, 205-07, R. 7008:301-302, 
308-309. But the home went out with an underinserted range riser nonetheless, showing 
that Oakwood's employees do not always follow the procedures they are supposed to. 
Given these facts, and the inferences that can be drawn from them, it is clearly not 
"indisputable" that new holes were drilled and the pipe assembly unblocked on the 
Ercanbrack unit. It was therefore permissible for Dr. Alex to rely on the other evidence 
in his possession, including the evidence of the improper threading and insertion, the 
weakening of the range riser, the location of a fracture point at the range riser, the char-
acteristics and properties of the steel at issue, and the subsequent events, and point out 
that Oakwood's employees likely could have manipulated the riser pipe to align with the 
floor holes, and that the forces required to manipulate the pipe would have been enough 
to cause a leak to develop after delivery.14 
Expert testimony is admissible if it will "assist the trier of fact . . . to determine a 
fact in issue." Utah R. Evid. 702. For the jury to determine whether, as Mr. Ercanbrack 
14
 The Court can also disregard Oakwood's claim that Mr. John Bailey of Summit 
Propane "corroborated Oakwood's testimony that it would not force pipes into place." 
Oakwood Br. at 31. Mr, Bailey did not see the Ercanbrack home during construction; all 
he can say is that when he hooked the home's gas system to the external propane tank, he 
did not observe any irregularities. But he didn't crawl under the house. R. 7004:35-36. 
Further, that the pipes appeared vertical when Mr. Bailey hooked the system up suggests 
that the riser may have been straightened after being forced through the hole, which 
would have contributed to the bending forces at its base. 
asserted, the improper threading and insertion of the pipes and risers led to the explosion, 
the jury would have to know how the threading and insertion would affect the pipe 
assembly, what forces would be placed on the assembly as a result, whether those forces 
would be enough to fracture the steel used, and how a fracture induced during manu-
facture could have remained gas tight for six months. Dr. Alex's testimony goes directly 
to these issues and plainly assisted the trier of fact in understanding and evaluating Mr. 
Ercanbrack's claim against Oakwood. There was thus nothing improper about Dr. Alex's 
testimony concerning the manipulation of the risers during the construction of the home. 
See, e.g., Patey ffif 23-26, 977 P.2d at 1198 (dentist allowed to testify about types of 
blows to the head that could damage teeth and to testify that vehicle accident "was the 
type of event that could have caused [plaintiffs] dental injuries"); Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Hugh Cole Builder, Inc., 137 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1289 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (expert's opinions 
"need not prove the plaintiffs' case by themselves; they must merely constitute one piece 
of the puzzle that the plaintiffs endeavor to assemble before the jury."); Orth v. Emerson 
Elec. Co., 980 F.2d 632, 637 (10th Cir. 1992) (expert "was not expounding on novel 
scientific evidence, but was taking known facts, together with his knowledge of causation 
factors, and drawing a rational conclusion as to causation"). 
b. Testimony Regarding Governing Standards. 
The Court can quickly dispose of Oakwood's claim that Dr. Alex's testimony sup-
posedly "ignores" the governing standards. Oakwood Br. at 29. In claiming that ANSI 
B 1.20.1 was only a "guideline," Oakwood presents only part of the story. For example, 
Oakwood stipulated that the pipes were overthreaded by three threads. R. 7000:41-42; R. 
7007:240. Further, while Oakwood's HUD expert attempted to testify that B 1.20.1 did 
not apply, he also admitted during his examination that (l)HUD requires all manufac-
tured homes to comply with National Fire Protection Association standard 54 (NFPA 54), 
and (2) NFPA 54 states that "[m]etallic pipe and fitting threads shall be taper pipe threads 
and shall comply with [ANSI Bl.20.1]." R. 7010:10. Mr. Slifka further acknowledged 
that a manufactured home builder could not ignore Bl.20.1.15 R. 7010:39. Finally, 
Oakwood itself contended that NFPA 54 required "approximately ten" threads on each 
connection end, and the 14-thread pipes clearly violated the standard that Oakwood pro-
fessed. R. 7011:240. Thus, Dr. Alex had a basis to testify that the threading and 
insertion of pipes breached applicable standards. 
c. Disagreements Between Alex and Moore. 
The Court can also reject Oakwood's argument that some of Dr. Alex's testimony 
should be excluded because Dr. Alex supposedly did not run a specific "complete" test to 
see if he could achieve a partial fracture by forcing a misaligned riser into a floor hole, or 
because Oakwood's expert, Mr. Moore, performed other tests or disagreed with some of 
his conclusions. Oakwood Br. at 35-37. 
Yet again, Oakwood does not specify which portions of Dr. Alex's testimony 
15
 Oakwood states that HUD does not enforce the requirement that metallic pipe and 
fitting threads comply with Bl.20.1. Oakwood Br. at 30. But HUD's decision not to 
enforce certain standards does not mean that the standards do not exist. As Mr. 
Ercanbrack argued in closing at trial, just because police officers choose not to ticket 
motorists who drive 80 miles per hour on a freeway does not change the fact that the 
speed limit is 70, and that if a driver kills someone while going 80, the driver was 
violating the speed limit. 
should be excluded for any of these reasons. Moreover, Oakwood did not preserve these 
objections to any portions of Dr. Alex's testimony by raising them below. Oakwood did 
not suggest that Dr. Alex's testimony should be excluded because he did not "try[] to 
simulate his story through one complete experiment to test its validity," (Oakwood Br. at 
36) nor did Oakwood object when Dr. Alex testified that it would take 80 to 100 pounds 
to move the risers to accommodate the misalignment, but that the underinserted range 
riser would fail at about 80 pounds. See R. 7008:59-60, Add. Ex. 12. 
Further, Oakwood's challenge fails on the merits, because the mere fact that Mr. 
Moore disagrees with Dr. Alex or decided to run different tests does not mean that Dr. 
Alex's testimony is inadmissible. Oakwood presents no evidence or expert opinion that a 
single "complete experiment" was necessary for the particular failure being studied, or 
that the combination of the tests Dr. Alex ran was scientifically unreliable. Indeed, while 
Mr. Moore disagreed that a person would be likely to achieve a partial thickness fracture 
under actual assembly conditions, Mr. Moore did not suggest that Dr. Alex's methods 
were inadequate or suspect. And Oakwood cites no other authority suggesting that Rule 
702 or Rimmasch require a single "complete experiment," Indeed, this Court has held 
that even under Rimmasch, the issue is whether the expert's methodology was properly 
applied, not whether a different methodology could have been used. Brewer v. Denver & 
Rio Grande W. R. R„ 2001 UT 77,1123 n.5, 31 P.3d 557. 
Similarly, disagreements between Mr. Moore and Dr. Alex as to how rigid the 
pipe assembly was, how much force would be required to partially fracture a riser, the 
likelihood of a fracture, and whether arrest marks or oxidation would be expected do not 
suggest that Dr. Alex's testimony is inadmissible. The disagreements between Mr. 
Moore and Dr. Alex do not go to the adequacy of the methods and techniques either ex-
pert used in his analysis, but rather to the accuracy of the conclusions they drew. Mr. 
Moore did not testify that Dr. Alex's methods were inadequate or that the failure to 
perform a certain test rendered Dr. Alex's results unreliable. This is significant because, 
as addressed earlier, Rimmasch and other authorities are concerned primarily with the 
principles and techniques underlying an expert's opinions, and not the opinions them-
selves. Adams % 16, 5 P.3d at 647.16 
It is not surprising that expert witnesses for opposing parties draw different con-
clusions from the same evidence, and "disagreement among experts, and even between 
the experts and the judge, is not a valid basis for exclusion of testimony." Alder % 60, 61 
P.3d at 1084. As long as evidence is scientific and will assist the jury, it is for the trier of 
fact to weigh the testimony of opposing experts, determine which testimony is most ac-
curate or believable, and enter a verdict accordingly. IdL The jury did exactly that here. 
D. Judge Hilder carefully and appropriately exercised his discretion, and 
his ruling is entitled to deference. 
Because the exercise of discretion "necessarily reflects the personal judgment of 
Oakwood attempts to get a lot of mileage out of Dr. Alex's choice not to examine 
fracture surfaces with the SEM. Dr. Alex basically "wrote the book" on the use of the 
SEM for fracture analysis, however, as he was involved in creating the first handbook on 
the use of electrofractography. R. 7007:231. His conclusions that an SEM examination 
would not be appropriate, or that a "negative" result of an SEM analysis would not be 
significant because of the mild steel and the pipe dope, are entitled to a great deal of 
weight. Further, Dr. Alex did use an SEM to confirm that arrest marks would not appear 
on a pipe that was partially broken, left to sit for six months, and then fully broken. R. 
7008:31-35. 
the [trial] court," an appellate court "can properly find abuse only if no reasonable per-
son would take the view adopted by the trial court." State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 340 
(Utah 1997) (internal punctuation, citations, and brackets omitted). This is not a case like 
Rimmasch itself, where "little foundation was offered or demanded by the court as to the 
scientific basis" for the testimony. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 395. Judge Hilder clearly did 
not shirk his "gatekeeping" responsibilities or simply let everything go to the jury. 
Instead, the record shows that Judge Hilder carefully read each party's filings, considered 
each party's arguments, and fully participated in the Rimmasch hearing, asking detailed 
questions of counsel and of Dr. Alex. At the conclusion of the proceedings, Judge Hilder 
came to a reasoned determination that a sufficient basis existed to enable Dr. Alex to pre-
sent his opinions. He even gave Oakwood the ability to revisit some of the issues later, 
though Oakwood failed to do so. There is no justification for this Court to conclude that 
Judge Hilder clearly abused his discretion in allowing the testimony. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF OAKWOOD'S MOTION FOR JUDG-
MENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED, 
A. Oakwood waived its right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
on appeal. 
1. Oakwood failed to move for a directed verdict at the close of 
all the evidence. 
Under Rule 50(b), a party who fails to move for a directed verdict at the close of 
all the evidence may not pursue a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and 
therefore cannot challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict: 
Whenever a motion for directed verdict made at the close of all the 
evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to 
have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the 
legal questions raised by the motion. Not later than ten days after entry of 
judgment, a party who has moved for a directed verdict may move to have 
the verdict and any judgment thereon set aside . . . . 
Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b) (emphasis added). 
Applying the identical federal rule, federal circuits hold that a party that fails to 
renew a motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence is precluded from 
challenging on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence. See, e.g., Delano-Pyle v. Victoria 
County, 302 F.3d 567, 572-74 (5th Cir. 2002) (refusing to consider challenge to suf-
ficiency of evidence where party failed to renew motion for directed verdict at close of all 
evidence).17 As in Delano-Pyle, Oakwood moved for a directed verdict at the close of 
Mr. Ercanbrack's case-in-chief. R. 7008:168. Oakwood did not renew its motion, how-
ever, choosing instead to wait and see how the jury ruled. R. 7011:224-243. 
Rule 50(b) may be harsh, but it is clear: If a party wants to challenge a verdict 
based on insufficiency of the evidence, the party must renew its challenge before the case 
goes to the jury. The party cannot wait to see how the jury rules before pursuing a claim 
that the evidence was not sufficient. Oakwood decided to take its chances on a jury ver-
dict, which would be essentially immune from attack on appeal, instead of asking for a 
directed verdict that would be reviewed de novo. Having made that choice, Oakwood 
cannot raise its challenge now. 
17
 See also Karns v. Emerson, 817 F.2d 1452, 1455 (10th Cir. 1987); Frederick v. Dist. 
of Columbia. 254 F.3d 156, 161 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Jackson v. St. Louis. 220 F.3d 894, 
896 (8th Cir. 2000); Keisling v. Ser-Jobs For Progress. Inc., 19 F.3d 755, 758-759 (1st 
Cir. 1994); Scala v. Moore McCormack Lines. 985 F.2d 680, 684 (2nd Cir. 1993). 
2. Oakwood failed to marshal the evidence. 
Further, the Court should disregard Oakwood's challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting the verdict because Oakwood has not marshaled all of the evidence 
supporting the verdict. To meet the strict marshaling requirement, a party wishing to 
attack a jury verdict must "marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then dem-
onstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict." Harding v. Bell M.D., 2002 UT 108, H 19, 57 P.3d 1093 (internal quotation and 
citation omitted). The party must assume the role of "devil's advocate" and "fully em-
brace the adversary's position," which requires marshaling "every scrap of evidence that 
supports the jury's finding" and explaining why that evidence is insufficient as a matter 
of law. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Oakwood has not met its burden. As shown below, Oakwood failed to direct the 
Court to significant evidence supporting the jury's conclusion that a defect in the propane 
system, most likely the range riser, led to the explosion. The Court should therefore 
reject Oakwood's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the judgment. 
B. Mr. Ercanbrack presented sufficient evidence to allow the jury to 
conclude that a defect in the propane system caused the explosion. 
The jury has the sole responsibility for weighing disputed and contradictory 
evidence. Accordingly, a court will not overturn a jury verdict unless "the evidence to 
support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make 
the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." Jenkins v. Weis, 868 P.2d 1374, 1378 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (internal quotation and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). A 
court will, therefore, reverse a jury verdict "only if, taking the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party, the appellant demonstrates that the findings lack sub-
stantial evidentiary support." Keil 2002 UT 32, Tj 15, 48 P.3d at 892 (citation omitted). 
The court does not weigh evidence; instead, the court will "view all evidence and all rea-
sonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to that verdict." Id, ^ [2. 
Further, this Court has explained in a similar products liability case that "causation 
issues are factual issues that generally cannot be resolved as a matter of law." Nay v. 
General Motors, 850 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Utah 1993). Accordingly, a jury's determination 
of causation will be upheld when "there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury 
could infer causation." Id. (emphasis added). 
In Nay, two men were killed when their truck drove off a curve. Their heirs sued, 
alleging that the truck's braking system had a "pinch point" between the steering coup-
ling and steering box. The plaintiffs "theorized" that a stone or other small object had 
wedged in the pinch point and locked the steering. 
Three experts testified for the plaintiffs. One stated that a tire "could have" 
clipped a stone on the road and caused it to ricochet into the steering gear. Another stated 
that it would be "very easy" for a tire to throw a rock into the gear. The third stated that a 
stone could bounce into the gear "extremely infrequently." The trial court directed a 
verdict for the defendants, but this Court reversed, holding that the evidence was suf-
ficient to find that the defective steering gear caused the accident. The Court's reasoning 
is important for the present case: 
Here, the Nays' expert witnesses met the Butterfield standard. Taken 
together, their testimony establishes a complete, specific theory of both 
defect and causation. They identify the defect as the pinch point between 
the flexible coupling and the steering box. They sketch a comprehensive 
factual scenario of causation in which a tire clipped a stone lying on the 
road and the stone ricocheted from the fender; onto the top of the tire and 
into the steering gear, causing the steering wheel to lock. Certainly, 
General Motors can and does contest the likelihood, even the possibility, of 
this scenario. It is free to call its own witnesses to testify that the tire would 
not have clipped the stone, that the stone could not have bounced into the 
pinch point, and that even if the stone did bounce into the pinch point, it 
would not have locked the steering. But this very dispute creates an issue 
of fact within the province of the jury. Taking the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Nays, as we must, [citation omitted], we cannot say 
that reasonable jurors could not find in favor of the Nays. 
Id. at 1264 (emphasis added). 
Under these standards, there is clearly enough evidence to support the jury's 
factual determination that a defect in the home caused the explosion. First, the evidence 
is sufficient to establish that the explosion was caused by a propane leak from one of 
the three fracture points in the pipe in the crawl space, one of which was at the base of 
the range riser. As explained above, Mr. Thatcher's and Dr. Romig's testimony estab-
lished that the propane leaked from the crawl space and that the system was gas tight 
everywhere except for the three fracture points, one of which was at the base of the range 
riser. Because the gas had to come from a breach in the system, and the only breaches in 
the system were at the fracture points, the propane leak had to be at one of the fracture 
points. Oakwood does not challenge this testimony on appeal, and the jury had the right 
to believe it instead of Oakwood's conflicting evidence that the leak came from outside. 
Second, the evidence is sufficient to establish that the horizontal pipes were 
overthreaded and overinserted into most joints, which would be likely to cause forces to 
be placed at the base of the range riser during and after assembly. Oakwood admitted 
that the horizontal joints had 14 threads and were fully engaged, which reduced the dis-
tance between the risers. This reduction made it likely that the assembler would manip-
ulate the risers and the pipe assembly, which would have placed significant bending 
forces on the base of the risers. Also, the overtorqued joints made the pipe assembly 
more rigid, increasing the forces on the risers. R. 7008:49, 50. 
Third, the evidence establishes that the overthreading and underinsertion of the 
range riser into the elbow joint weakened the riser and rendered it more susceptible to 
bending forces. Dr. Alex and Mr. Moore both testified that with eight threads showing, 
the joint between the riser and the elbow was less able to withstand the forces that would 
have been applied to align or straighten the risers during the manufacturing process. 
Fourth, the evidence shows that the subsequent events relating to the home are 
perfectly consistent with a full fracture temporarily sealed with pipe dope or a partial or 
full thickness fracture at the base of the range riser and subsequent development of 
that fracture into a leak. The forces required to manipulate the risers and the pipe 
assembly during construction were enough to partially or fully fracture the weakened 
base of the range riser. R. 7008:55-64. After assembly, the home was driven "wildly" on 
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the back of a truck down a washboard road (R. 7004:19), and then subjected to the tern-
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Because the distance between the holes in the floor was more than the distance 
between the riser bases, the floor was essentially putting a minimum of 12 pounds of 
constant "spreading" forces on the risers. R. 7008:58. But every time the home hit a 
bump on the road, the pipes would move "up," i.e., closer to the floor, thus putting 
additional spreading forces on the risers. 
perature variations of northern Utah. R. 7011:106-109. Meanwhile, the risers were still 
under constant stress due the continued misalignment of the risers. R. 7008:58. These 
factors would be sufficient to cause a partial thickness fracture to eventually develop into 
a full thickness fracture and a leak. R. 7008:65-66. That the propane system was gas 
tight after delivery and setup in August, but was clearly not gas tight in January, provides 
further confirmation that the leak resulted from a partial fracture that did not develop into 
a full fracture until later, or possibly that the riser was fully fractured and that the pipe 
dope kept the joint gas tight. 
Fifth, there is substantial evidence, which Oakwood failed to marshal, from which 
the jury could conclude that Oakwood did not drill a new hole or unblock the gas line to 
accommodate the misalignment of the risers on the Ercanbrack home. To reiterate 
what was said above, no one testified that a new hole was drilled or the line unblocked, 
the traveler does not say that a new hole was drilled or the line unblocked, and the piece 
of tin for the old hole was never seen by anyone upon inspection or found at the scene. 
Also, Oakwood personnel admitted that holes were not always redrilled when the risers 
were not vertical (R. 7004:155, 158-159); that Oakwood employees would "jiggle" pipes 
when they did not fit right (R. 7008:180; Oakwood Br. at 28); and that even though pipes 
were off from vertical 5 to 10 percent of the time (R. 7004:158), holes were drilled, at 
most, only 1 to 30 times during Mr. Gibson's years at Oakwood (R. 7004:155). Finally, 
an assembler easily may have just chosen to jerk the pipe assembly over by 1.3 inches 
instead of stopping his or her work on the assembly line to drill a new hole. 
The evidence discussed above is more than sufficient to support a finding that a 
defect in the home, most likely a fracture at the base of the range riser, caused the explo-
sion that killed Mr. Ercanbrack's wife, son, and daughter. Indeed, the evidence is suf-
ficient to support the judgment even without Dr. Alex's testimony. Mr. Thatcher and Dr. 
Romig established that the explosion was caused by a leak in the crawl space pipes. 
There is no evidence that anyone but Oakwood ever even touched those pipes. That the 
home exploded six months after it was sold, due to a leak in pipes that only Oakwood 
touched, indicates that the most likely explanation is defective manufacture or assembly. 
Under the "product malfunction" doctrine, as reflected in the Restatement of 
Torts, if a product malfunctions under circumstances in which a defect is the most likely 
or reasonable explanation, a jury may infer that the product was defective even if the 
plaintiff cannot identify the specific defect: 
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused by a 
product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution, without proof of a 
specific defect, when the incident that harmed the plaintiff: 
(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect; and 
(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes other than 
product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution. 
Restatement (Third) Torts: Products Liability § 3 (1998) (emphasis added). See, e.g., 
Welge v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 17 F.3d 209, 210 (7th Cir. 1994) (when plaintiff was 
injured by shattered jar, court held that because the plaintiff testified that he did not 
damage the jar, then as a matter of logic, "the defect must have been introduced earlier, 
when the jar was in the hands of the defendants."). 
Utah has long recognized this concept. More than fifty years ago, this Court held 
that evidence that a truck wheel collapsed in an accident that took place only six months 
after the truck was bought could support an inference that the wheel was defective when 
sold. See Hooper v. General Motors Corp., 123 Utah 515, 260 P.2d 549 (1953). The 
Court held that even if the mere fact of separation was not enough to prove a defect, cir-
cumstantial evidence such as the newness and low mileage of the truck, the lack of prior 
damage, and other evidence "may have provided the requisite force to tip the scales in 
favor of plaintiff. Certainly, reasonable men from the cumulative factual total could 
infer, and with the consideration of rim-spider separation may have inferred, that the 
wheel was defective at the time of assembly." Id, 260 P.2d at 551-52 (emphasis added). 
See also Hewitt v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 3 Utah 2d 354, 284 P.2d 471 (1955) 
(discussing when causation may be inferred from circumstantial evidence). 
For more analysis and authority on the malfunction doctrine, see David G. Owen, 
Manufacturing Defects, 53 S. Car. L. Rev. 851, 871-84 (2002); Annotation: Strict 
Products Liability: Product Malfunction or Occurrence of Accident as Evidence of 
Defect, 65 A.L.R.4th 346 (1988) (collecting dozens of cases). 
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 While Mr. Ercanbrack did not explicitly rely on the "malfunction doctrine" below, he 
pursued a theory below of res ipsa loquitur, which is a close relation. Moreover, an 
appellate court may affirm a trial court's ruling on any ground appearing in the record. 
Indeed, Mr. Ercanbrack specifically requested that the trial court instruct the jury on 
res ipsa loquitur (R. 6692-6694), but the trial court rejected the instruction, evidently on 
the ground that Oakwood was not in control of the home for the six months prior to the 
explosion. See R. 3885-86. The trial court erred in so ruling, because under Utah law, a 
plaintiff need not show that the defendant was in sole control, only that the defendant 
"was responsible for all the likely causes of the accident." iSee Walker v. Parish Chem-
ical Co., 914 P.2d 1157, 1159-60 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). The testimony of Mr. Thatcher 
and Dr. Romig established that the leak must have come from the crawl space, and the 
There is sufficient evidence to infer a defect in the present case. The home's pro-
pane system obviously malfunctioned, as such systems are not supposed to leak and 
explode six months after they are bought. Cf R. 7005:133-34 (Oakwood would not 
expect gas lines to leak). The only other explanation offered for the explosion was a leak 
in the regulator box, but Thatcher and Romig testified that a leak there could not have 
caused the explosion. And no one suggested that Mr. Ercanbrack or anyone else worked 
on the pipes in the crawl space or altered or misused the pipes in any way. 
Once Dr. Alex's testimony and the other evidence discussed above is considered, 
it becomes even more clear that the jury had enough evidence to conclude that the defect 
in the propane system led to the explosion. Oakwood complains that there is no direct 
evidence that its personnel actually manipulated the pipes to insert the risers, but Oak-
wood misses the point: It was permissible for the jury to infer, based on substantial 
circumstantial evidence, that the pipes were manipulated. The overinsertion of the hor-
izontal pipes caused misalignment of the risers with the floor holes, thus creating a 
situation in which manipulation of the pipes was likely; the underinsertion of the range 
pipes in the crawl space were all made and installed by Oakwood. Thus, in reliance on 
this testimony, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the requirements of res ipsa 
loquitur were satisfied. 
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 Mr. Ercanbrack did build the box around the regulator and bury the lines leading to the 
home. But neither of these actions contributed to the accident. NFPA 58 specifically 
recommends that a regulator in "snow country" be protected by a box (to prevent 
accumulations that could break the regulator), and Mr. Ercanbrack built the box on the 
recommendation of Summit Propane. R. 7001:26. Indeed, one of Oakwood's experts, 
confirmed that it was proper for Mr. Ercanbrack to build the box over the regulator. R. 
7011:216. Moreover, burying the outside gas lines had no effect on the accident, because 
those lines were found after the explosion to be leak free. R. 7011:172. 
riser exacerbated the effects of any such manipulation; the forces that would be required 
to align the risers would be enough to fracture the riser; and the subsequent events, in-
cluding manifestation of a leak six months later, are exactly what one would expect to 
happen with such a fracture. The jury to considered evidence and resolved this question 
of fact in Mr. Ercanbrack's favor. 
Either Oakwood drilled a hole to accommodate the misaligned risers, or Oakwood 
manipulated the pipes to make the risers fit. Because Oakwood admitted that its person-
nel were allowed to "jiggle" pipe (which itself violates HUD procedures, according to 
Mr. Slifka (see R. 7009:148)), there is substantial doubt about Oakwood's claim that its 
standard procedures really would have required a new hole to be drilled. Also, while 
there was no evidence that the hole was redrilled, there was evidence that the hole was 
not redrilled. Further, given the inconveniences involved and the fact that the misalign-
ment would have appeared minor and easily correctable (1.3 inches), one can easily 
understand why an assembler might not redrill a hole in such circumstances. Finally, 
once again, the subsequent chain of events is consistent with a new hole not being drilled. 
Thus, the jury was certainly not compelled to conclude that the hole was redrilled in the 
Ercanbrack home, but was allowed to infer that the pipes were manipulated instead. 
Just as in Nay, Mr. Ercanbrack's evidence "sketch[es] a comprehensive factual 
scenario of causation" in which the risers were misaligned and the risers and pipe 
assembly were manipulated, placing extra force on the weakened joint at the base of the 
range riser and causing a fracture, which eventually developed into a full thickness frac-
ture due to thermal contraction and expansion. Notably, in Nay there was no direct evid-
ence that a stone actually was kicked up from the road and into the steering gear; rather, 
the experts testified that a stone "could have" been kicked up, which would have caused 
the accident to happen just as it did. This Court held that such evidence is sufficient to 
support a finding on causation, which is a highly factual matter. At worst, Mr. Ercan-
brack is in the same position as the plaintiffs in Nay. 
In determining what inferences may "reasonably" be drawn from circumstantial 
evidence, one must consider whether alternative explanations are equally or more con-
sistent with that evidence. If one scenario is plausible and no other scenarios are 
plausible, then the first scenario becomes "probable." Cf Welge, 17 F.3d at 212 (if the 
probability that the defect arose after the product was sold is small, "then the probability 
that the defect was introduced by one of the defendants is very high"). We know that 
propane leaked and exploded, and the only other explanation Oakwood offered was that 
something happened to the connection at the regulator to cause a leak there, and gas then 
migrated out of the regulator box, through snow lying on the ground, and into a vent that 
led into the crawl space. But Oakwood presented no evidence that anything happened to 
the connection at the regulator or that gas leaked there, Mr. Ercanbrack testified without 
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contradiction that there was no snow linking the regulator box to the vent, and Mr. 
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Indeed, it is curious that Oakwood accuses Mr. Ercanbrack and Dr. Alex of ignoring 
"undisputed facts" with their theory of causation. As Mr. Freeman acknowledged, 
Oakwood's whole theory of the case depends on there being snow "over the box ... and at 
least part way up the vent." See R. 7011:220. But Mr. Ercanbrack testified that he 
shoveled the snow away from the vents (R. 7001:50-54), and there is no evidence in the 
record to the contrary. Thus, it is undisputed that there was no snow that would have 
allowed propane to migrate from the regulator box into the vent, but this did not stop 
Oakwood from presenting their theory. 
Thatcher and Dr. Romig both testified that an outside leak could not have caused the 
explosion. The jury was certainly not compelled to believe Oakwood's "story," and as 
such the scenario Mr. Ercanbrack presented was the only remaining plausible explan-
ation. It was therefore at least reasonable for the jury to accept it. 
Oakwood's remaining arguments on the sufficiency of the evidence can be easily 
rejected. Oakwood claims that there was no evidence that the pipe joints were defective, 
because Mr. Slifka testified that the home "would pass the applicable regulations" and 
"did not have a defect." Oakwood Br. at 47. Oakwood is wrong, however. 
The "defect" that led to the explosion was not merely the improper threading and 
insertion, but also the fracture at the base of the range riser. As explained above, the 
jury concluded from the evidence (including the evidence of improper threading and 
insertion) that when the home was delivered to the Ercanbracks, there was most likely a 
fracture in the base of the range riser, which ended up causing an explosion. The fracture 
certainly constitutes a "defect." Cf Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(2) (product is "defective" 
or "unreasonably dangerous" if it is "dangerous to an extent beyond which would be con-
templated by the ordinary or prudent buyer").23 
Further, there was ample evidence that the improper threading and insertion itself 
constituted a defect. As stated earlier, Oakwood's own personnel testified that the under-
23
 Presumably, Oakwood does not deny that a partially fractured gas line is a defect. 
Oakwood has stated that HUD regulations require only that a home be gas tight when it 
leaves the facility, but this is highly doubtful. If Oakwood were correct, then a 
manufacturer could patch a known hole in a gas pipe with a piece of duct tape, and as 
long as the duct tape held long enough to survive the pressure test, the home would 
supposedly not be "defective." This simply cannot be. 
insertion of the range riser was "unacceptable" and should have been corrected. R. 
7004:151-152; R. 7008:270, 301-302, 308-309.24 This testimony is sufficient to show a 
defect, regardless of HUD standards. Moreover, as established above, there was a dis-
pute about whether the HUD standards incorporated ANSI B 1.20.1, and therefore the 
jury had sufficient evidence to conclude that the threading and insertion of the pipes 
violated HUD standards.25 
Everything points to the base of the range riser. Mr. Thatcher's and Dr. Romig's 
testimony shows that the base of the range riser was one of only three possible locations 
for the leak. Dr. Alex's testimony regarding overthreading and overinsertion of the hor-
izontal pipes shows that the base of the range riser would be subject to bending forces 
during manufacture. And Alex's testimony regarding underinsertion shows that the base 
of the range riser was more susceptible to such forces. Given the constellation of facts, 
Oakwood has not shown that the evidence to support the verdict was "completely 
lacking" or "so slight and unconvincing" as to render the verdict "plainly unreasonable 
and unjust." 
Richard Gibson, Oakwood's plumbing tester and inspector, even stated that more than 
3 to 4 threads showing was unacceptable because of the "possibility of promoting a leak." 
R. 7004:151. 
The Court can also reject Oakwood's contention that the "objective evidence" is 
inconsistent with a defect existing when the house was sold, simply because the system 
did not leak until six months later. Once again, Dr. Alex clearly explained how a partial 
fracture could exist and later develop into a full fracture, i.e., a leak, and no one 
contradicted his testimony in this respect. Thus, the fact that the structure was gas tight 
on the date of sale does not mean that it was not defective on that date. 
IIL THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE AS TO THE 
TIME MR. ERCANBRACK ACTUALLY REPORTED THE EXPLOSION. 
A. Oakwood unjustifiably relied on an ambiguous admission. 
In its opening statement, Oakwood told the jury that Mr. Ercanbrack was the first 
person to report the explosion to the Sheriffs Office, through a call at 6:05 p.m. R. 
7000:61. Then, clearly insinuating impropriety on the part of Mr. Ercanbrack, Oak-
wood's trial counsel stated, "I don't know what he did, but there is a lot of time 
unaccounted for." Id. In doing so, Oakwood's trial counsel clearly adopted an ill-
conceived strategy to place blame on Mr. Ercanbrack. 
At the time of Oakwood's opening, however, Oakwood was on notice that the call 
was not made at 6:05 p.m. and that Mr. Ercanbrack had no time that was "unaccounted 
for" in which he could have engaged in wrongdoing. Indeed, the pretrial record, 
including the deposition testimony and Investigator Borg's Report, showed that Mr. 
Ercanbrack reported the explosion at 5:05 p.m., rather than 6:05. 
Completely ignoring this record, Oakwood latched onto Mr. Ercanbrack's res-
ponse to Request for Admission No. 12 - badly written by Oakwood - in which Mr. 
Ercanbrack admitted that he reported the explosion to the Sheriffs Office and that the 
Sheriffs Office recorded the call in its report as being received at 6:05 p.m. He did not 
admit that he called at 6:05 p.m.! 
On appeal, Oakwood complains that the trial court erred in admitting evidence 
contrary to the admission to Request No. 12, and that allowing the evidence was "highly 
prejudicial to Oakwood and incited the jury's passion against Oakwood." Oakwood Br. 
at 50. Oakwood analyzes this issue as though the trial court improperly granted leave to 
withdraw or amend an admission under Rule 36(b). Oakwood misses the point. 
This is not a situation where the trial court granted leave to withdraw or amend the 
admission. Rather, the trial court admitted Mr. Ercanbrack's response to Oakwood's 
poorly drafted request for admission, and, in its discretion, properly allowed testimony to 
explain the admission, stating "my fundamental purpose here is to give the jury the whole 
picture." R. 6997:30. It did so because Request No. 12 was ambiguous. R. 6997:29-30. 
Ambiguity in a request for admission is construed against the party whose lawyer drafted 
the response. See, e^g,, Tallev v. United States, 990 F.2d 695, 699 (1st Cir. 1993). 
Construing the request against Oakwood makes the court's determination to let in both 
the ambiguous admission and evidence regarding the true timing eminently more fair. 
The court's ruling was particularly appropriate given that the only conceivable relevance 
of the timing of Mr. Ercanbrack's call to the Sheriffs Office was to create a fictitious 50 
to 60 minutes of unaccounted time so that Oakwood could falsely insinuate that Mr. 
Ercanbrack tampered with evidence at the site of the explosion. 
B. To the extent Rule 36 applied, its prerequisites were met 
Even if the prerequisites of Rule 36(b) applied before the trial court could properly 
exercise its discretion to allow the evidence, those prerequisites were met. First, the 
timing of the call clearly would promote the presentation of the merits of the case. "To 
show that a presentation of the merits of an action would be served by amendment or 
withdrawal of an admission, the party seeking amendment must (1) show that the matters 
deemed admitted against it are relevant to the merits of the underlying cause of action, 
and (2) introduce some evidence by affidavit or otherwise of specific facts indicating that 
the matters deemed admitted against it are in fact untrue." Langeland v. Monarch 
Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058, 1062 (Utah 1998). These showings were made easily. 
When Oakwood insinuated impropriety on the part of Mr. Ercanbrack, based on the false 
claim there was "a lot of time unaccounted for," the overwhelming evidence of the true 
time of the call became relevant. 
Second, Oakwood failed to meet its burden to show it would be prejudiced by the 
trial court's allowing testimony showing the time Mr. Ercanbrack actually called. The 
prejudice contemplated by Rule 36(b) "relates to the difficulty a party may face in 
proving the case, e.g., cause[d] by the unavailability of key witnesses, because of the 
sudden need to obtain evidence with respect to the questions previously answered by the 
admissions." Id. at 1063 (quotation and citations omitted). Oakwood was not prejudiced 
in that regard - the evidence of the timing of the call was readily available. 
Indeed, the very evidence Oakwood challenges was freely admitted throughout the 
trial without objection. See, e ^ R. 7003:92-96, 102-03, 157-58; R. 7004:39-40. Much 
of this evidence was elicited by Oakwood itself! Oakwood introduced the Fire Marshal's 
Report of Investigation, which clearly stated that Mr. Ercanbrack reported the explosion 
at "5:05 p.m." Add. Ex. 5. Additionally, Oakwood itself extensively examined Mr. 
Ercanbrack about the timing of his call. R. 7003:90, 96. Thus, Oakwood has no valid 
basis to complain. 
Nevertheless, Oakwood complains that it "had already relied on the admission and 
made representations to the jury regarding the admission." Oakwood Br. at 52. As dis-
cussed above, however, Oakwood's reliance on the admission was wholly unreasonable. 
Oakwood also complains that "the evidence used to contradict the admissions had 
not previously been disclosed to Oakwood to show it would not be justified in relying on 
the admission." Id. at 52-53. That is flat wrong. Oakwood's counsel chose to ignore the 
deposition testimony and Fire Marshal's report. Oakwood should have fully considered 
this issue before adopting its strategy. The trial court had the discretion to allow the 
testimony in question. In doing so, the trial court not only did not abuse its discretion, the 
trial court exercised its discretion justly, with the utmost regard for fairness and truth. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GRANT A NEW 
TRIAL BECAUSE OF REMARKS IN CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
"The determination of whether remarks made during closing argument improperly 
influenced the verdict is within the sound discretion of the trial court." Green v. Louder, 
H 35, 29 P.3d at 647. Indeed, the trial judge is "of necessity, clothed with a great deal of 
discretion in determining whether an objectionable question is so prejudicial as to require 
a retrial, ... and he is in a far better position to measure the effect of an improper question 
on the jury than an appellate court which reviews only the cold record." Harris v. Zurich 
Ins. Co., 527 F.2d 528, 231 (5th Cir. 1975). 
"The general rule concerning abuse of discretion is that 'this [C]ourt will presume 
that the discretion of the trial court was properly exercised unless the record clearly 
shows the contrary.5" Donohue v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 748 P.2d 1067, 1068 
(Utah 1987) (quotation omitted). Here, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in 
determining that remarks made by plaintiffs counsel did not improperly influence the 
verdict. In attempting to overcome the presumption, Oakwood mischaracterizes the 
context of counsel's statements, and overstates or dramatizes the statements themselves. 
A. Mr. Ercanbrack's counsel did not improperly urge the jury to punish 
Oakwood by "sending a message." 
Oakwood cites a number of cases that address an invitation to the jury to "respond 
in damages" in order to "send a message" to the other party.26 The context of the 
argument in this case, however, had nothing to do with damages. Rather, the argument 
was clearly made in direct response to Oakwood's argument regarding liability, that is, 
that Oakwood did nothing wrong. In the clear context of arguing liability, plaintiffs 
counsel argued that by continuing the refrain that it did nothing wrong, Oakwood was 
effectively saying that it did not have to comply with applicable safety standards because 
the federal government is lax in enforcing them. In that context, plaintiffs counsel 
argued that if HUD, effectively, will not teach Oakwood that there are safety standards 
they should meet in manufacturing Oakwood's homes, then it is up to the jury to tell 
Oakwood that it should meet applicable safety standards, whether or not the federal 
government enforces those standards. R. 7012:19. This entire argument was made 
largely without objection by Oakwood. Id. When Oakwood objected, not only did the 
trial court give the jury a curative instruction - "that punitive damages are not an issue, 
[and that] any damages award must be to compensate not to punish," - but plaintiffs 
26
 Rg,, Fisher v. Mcllrov, 739 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (counsel invited the jury 
"to respond in damages" to show plaintiff that his behavior was almost wanton); Murphy 
v. Murphy, 622 So.2d 99, 102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (send a message through 
damages); Masson v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 642 P.2d 113 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982) 
(condemnation trial focused solely on computation of damages due to a taking). 
counsel himself quickly explained, "I'm not saying to punish them. That's not what I'm 
saying." R. 7012:21. He then proceeded, without any objection, to give the jury an 
example of what he meant, through the use of an analogy to speeding regulations. That 
such a safety standard is not enforced does not absolve one of wrongdoing for not 
violating it, as Oakwood was contending. R. 7012:22. 
Thus, the so-called "send a message" argument had nothing to do with asking the 
jury to "respond in damages" to "send a message" to Oakwood.27 This situation is not 
unlike that in Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, 29 P.3d 638, where the Court instructed that 
"the use of the 'golden rule' argument is improper only 'with respect to damages.'" Id. at 
Tj 36. "[T]he use of golden rule arguments is not improper when urged on the issue of 
ultimate liability." Id. 
The trial court's curative instruction, together with plaintiffs counsel's own 
explanation that he was not saying to punish Oakwood, his further explanation of the 
point by use of the speeding analogy, and the fact that counsel plainly was not discussing 
damages at that time, was clearly enough for the jury to understand the liability - rather 
than the damages - context. To argue otherwise does not give the jury its due. 
B. The other challenged arguments were not improper. 
Oakwood argued in its closing that it owed no duty based on any standards 
because the standards asserted by Mr. Ercanbrack did not apply. R. 7012:39-41. In 
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Indeed, plaintiffs counsel was not even discussing damages when he made the 
message statement. It was well after the "message" colloquy that counsel expressly 
turned the attention of the jury to the subject of damages. R. 7012:28. 
direct rebuttal, plaintiffs counsel argued that there were applicable standards that created 
a legal duty. R. 7012:69-70. In doing so, counsel did not improperly comment on the 
merits of Mr. Ercanbrack's case. While Oakwood objected that plaintiffs counsel was 
arguing how the court would have ruled or not ruled, Oakwood did not ask for any 
curative instruction, and, in the court's exercise of its discretion, none appeared needed. 
In support, Oakwood cites Donohue v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 748 P.2d 
1067 (Utah 1987), which instructs that "pleas plainly designed to elicit sympathy or to 
inspire passion or prejudice should not be allowed." IcL Mr. Ercanbrack's rebuttal to 
Oakwood's argument was not such a plea, nor was it an improper comment on the merits. 
As the Court in Donohue instructed, "Trial courts are in a much better position than are 
appellate courts to assess the overall effect of attorney misconduct at trial." Id. The trial 
court properly exercised its discretion in this regard. 
Oakwood also complains that "plaintiff raise[d] the ire of the jury by pointing out 
that the defendant is an out-of-state large corporation that is only interested in profit." 
Oakwood Br. at 61. Contrary to Oakwood's mischaracterization, plaintiffs counsel 
remarked that Oakwood manufactures large numbers of homes "for making a profit just 
like any other corporation." R. 7012:15. Viewed in proper context, plaintiffs counsel 
was only arguing that Oakwood should not be permitted to manufacture homes for sale 
around the country while ignoring governmental and industry safety standards. R. 
7012:15-16 ("[Y]ou got to at least follow the standards."). Oakwood's characterization 
of Mr. Ercanbrack's argument - "that because the defendant is a large, rich corporation, 
and because they know that the plaintiff is a poor resident of their own county, the jury 
should base its verdict in favor of plaintiff on this financial disparity" - is patently 
inaccurate and merely an attempt to make something out of what Oakwood already 
acknowledges "may not be sufficient to require reversal and remand for a new trial." 
Oakwood Br. at 61. Moreover, there were other references throughout the trial - by both 
sides, and all without objection - to the obvious fact that Oakwood is a large, out-of-state 
corporation. Oakwood's counsel even raised this issue in his own closing, expressly 
mentioning the jury instruction explaining that the corporate status should make no 
difference to them, and that they should decide on the evidence. R. 7012:64. If there was 
some prejudice, Oakwood cured it. 
Finally, plaintiffs counsel did not improperly argue credibility. Oakwood delib-
erately placed the credibility of Mr. Ercanbrack at issue. Oakwood's trial counsel ex-
pressed his own personal opinion that someone was lying, either SS Supply or Mr. 
Ercanbrack, and argued Mr. Ercanbrack had the motivation to lie and SS Supply did not. 
R. 7012:46, 49 ("J know this extra pipe was added, J know somebody's not telling us the 
truth. It's either SS or it's Mr. Ercanbrack but it's not Oakwood."). Oakwood now com-
plains that plaintiffs counsel improperly argued the credibility of SS Supply and Mr. 
Ercanbrack, yet, once again, Oakwood failed to object or request a curative instruction, 
and did not even raise this issue in its motion for a new trial. 
In arguing credibility, plaintiffs counsel remained within the record, reminding 
the jury about Mr. Bailey's (of SS Supply) manner of testifying (R. 7012:75), arguing an 
inference that Mr. Bailey was on Oakwood's side, having taken a position early in the 
litigation that focused blame away from SS Supply and directly at Mr. Ercanbrack. R. 
7012:76. In response to SS Supply and Oakwood both pointing to Mr. Ercanbrack as the 
liar, plaintiffs counsel merely said, "Bill's not lying." R. 7012:76. That remark is 
merely the other side of the coin - that there is no evidence that Mr. Ercanbrack is ly-
ing.28 Moreover, the jury was specifically instructed that they were the exclusive judges 
of the witnesses' credibility. There is no basis to conclude that the jury believed that 
counsel was commenting on Mr. Ercanbrack's credibility from his personal knowledge. 
Even if there was error - and there was not - it is certainly not established that the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court. Indeed, Oakwood did not object or 
request a curative instruction, which waives the improper argument. See Nesseth v. 
Omlid. 574N.W.2d 848, 851 (N.D. 1998).29 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the statement was made based on the 
personal knowledge of plaintiff s counsel or that it was based on anything other than the 
evidence, and inferences from the evidence, in the record. For example, plaintiffs 
counsel did not preface the statement with "I know ..." or "I believe ..." or "From my 
review of the evidence, I think ..." that "Bill's not lying." 
Oakwood has not shown how the allegedly improper argument was sufficiently 
prejudicial to warrant reversal - that "absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of 
a more favorable outcome for the appellant." State v. Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 79, f 18, 
34 P.3d 187. The issue on which Oakwood asserted that either SS Supply or Mr. 
Ercanbrack was a liar is a non-issue. The issue went to who placed the stub-out - SS 
Supply or Mr. Ercanbrack. Since the evidence was clear that neither the stub-out nor its 
connections leaked, and that no matter who placed the stub-out, it presented no problem 
when the regulator was installed (R. 7009:62, 133), the jury did not need to determine 
who was a "liar." The outcome of the case should not have differed, one way or the 
other, and therefore any error in this regard was harmless. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR REGARDING SS SUPPLY. 
Oakwood first contends that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that SS 
Supply was a proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries. But Oakwood's trial counsel 
expressly told the jury in his opening statement that the court had ruled as a matter of law 
that SS Supply was at fault (R. 7000:36-37) and had settled with plaintiff, and argued in 
closing that SS Supply had "considerable fault in this case," pointing out Jury Instruction 
No. 48, in which the defectiveness of SS Supply's tank was conclusively established (R. 
7012:53-58). The jury actually found in its verdict that SS Supply was a proximate 
cause of plaintiffs injuries and apportioned fault to them, R. 7013:5-6. 
Oakwood also complains that the trial court did not disclose to the jury the amount 
of SS Supply's settlement. As Oakwood acknowledges, however, "instances would be 
rare when the amount of the settlement should be disclosed." Slusher v. Ospital, 777 
P.2d 437, 444 (Utah 1989). It was the jury's province to attribute the relative fault, which 
it did. Under Utah's comparative fault scheme, a defendant is only liable for the portion 
of the plaintiffs damages attributable to that defendant's own conduct. Whether another 
party paid a substantial settlement, or was bankrupt and paid nothing, is irrelevant on the 
issue of the defendant's liability to the plaintiff. Disclosure of the amount of the 
settlement with SS Supply, which was irrelevant, could only have prejudiced the jury.30 
Perhaps as a testament to the collective wisdom of juries, the apportionment of fault in 
this case reflects almost exactly the settlement, i.e., the total damages awarded was 
$8,953,600, of which SS Supply's share of the fault was 40% or $3,581,440, and it had 
settled for $3.25 million! Indeed, on that basis, the jury could hardly be said to have been 
prejudiced, and its passion incited, through the trial court's alleged errors or the conduct 
of Mr. Ercanbrack's counsel. 
VI. THERE WAS NOT AN ACCUMULATION OF ERRORS SUBSTANTIAL 
AND PERVASIVE ENOUGH TO WARRANT A NEW TRIAL. 
Oakwood's feigned challenge based on the amount of time it had to put on its case 
is disingenuous. The trial court spoke in great detail during the trial with counsel for the 
parties about time considerations (e.g., R. 7009:88-93), and assured Oakwood that it 
would have time to "get [its] case on." R. 7009:88. At no time in that context did Oak-
wood's trial counsel object to the schedule or the amount of time that Oakwood had to 
put on its case, nor did Oakwood request additional time to call additional witnesses31 
Second, Oakwood complains about the trial court's exclusion of a belated expert 
test, the results of which were first presented to plaintiff during the trial. In the exercise 
of its discretion, the trial court ruled that he would not allow a new expert test to be 
offered for the first time during trial unless the test was offered in rebuttal to surprise 
testimony from the plaintiff. R. 6997:22. Oakwood has made no showing that such a 
ruling was an abuse of the trial court's discretion or otherwise was clearly in error. See 
Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah 1990) ("In 
reviewing questions of admissibility of evidence at trial, deference is given to the trial 
court's advantageous position; thus, that court's rulings regarding admissibility will not 
be overturned unless it appears that the lower court was in error.") 
This is not a case where there is an accumulation of errors sufficient to warrant a 
"J 1 
Oakwood contends in its brief that "Oakwood was forced to exclude several witnesses 
it had intended to call," citing R. 7007:17-20. Br. at 67. There is no reference in those 
pages of the record, however, to any discussion of the time Oakwood had to put on its 
case. 
new trial. Unlike Whitehead, the trial court in this case did not erroneously exclude or 
erroneously allow evidence. Oakwood was "entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one, 
for there are no perfect trials." See McDonough Power Equipment Inc. v. Greenwood, 
464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984). These are nothing more than after-the-fact, makeweight 
arguments to compensate for the fact that Oakwood has no legitimate basis for appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ercanbrack therefore respectfully requests that the Court affirm the judgment 
and remand for an award of costs incurred on this appeal. 
DATED: February 6, 2004. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
WILLIAM G. ERCANBRACK, 
called as a witness for and on behalf of the 
Defendant SS Supply and Summit Propane, being first 
duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows; 
BY MR. SILVESTER: 
Q. Mr, Ercanbrack, would you state your full 
name for the record, please, 
A. William G. Ercanbrack. 
Q. Where do you presently live? 
A. I am right now off and on at 3000 North 
Clarks Canyon Road. 
MR. PLANT: Mr. Ercanbrack, you're going to 
need to speak up, just so you know. 
Q. (BY MR. SILVESTER) What town is Clark 
Canyon Road in? 
A. Coalville. 
Q. I introduced myself before, I'm Fred 
Silvester, and I represent SS Supply and Summit 
Propane, Have you ever had a deposition taken 
before in any matter? 
A. No. 
Q. The purpose of this deposition is to get 
as much factual information as we can from you, 
PAGE 4 
In order to do that, the lawyers will be asking 
questions of you, and it will be important for us to 
get the best information you have. It's not a very 
natural process to be taking down questions and 
answers and turning them into some written document, 
so there will be certain rules we'll have to follow 
during the deposition. 
I will wait until you finish your answers 
before I begin my questions, if you'll give me the 
same courtesy and wait till my question is done 
before you start your answer. If we talk at the 
same time, we cause problems for the court reporter. 
It will be also necessary to answer out loud with 
either yeses or nos or full answers. Nods of the 
heads and uh huhs and huh uhs leave the court 
reporter to interpret our answers, 
There will be times during the day that we 
will be talking about matters involving the 
explosion at your former house that will be 
difficult for you, If you at any time need to take 
a break, please let us know, Certainly this is your 
testimony, you're the one that's under oath, so we 
want to make sure that you feel okay about 
continuing to testify. 
You may already be aware of this, but this 
ional Reporters, Salt Lake City, Utah - (801)322-3441 
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foot, maybe 18 inches or so, it teed and it went 
down to the range. And that's all there was. 
Q, And both those lines went up to the floor 
that hooked to those appliances? 
A. Yes. 
Q. September when you were under the house I 
guess preparing it for winter, did you notice 
anything unusual about those gas lines? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you recall any occasion after you moved 
into the home, when the gas lines were disconnected 
at any point? 
A. No. 
Q. So the range was never unhooked or the 
furnace was never unhooked, as far as you know? 
A. No. 
MR. PLANT: Let me take sure I understood 
that. At any time after it was initially connected, 
it was never disconnected again. Did I understand 
that right? 
THE WITNESS: Not to my knowledge. 
MR. PLANT: Sorry. 
MR, SILVESTER; No, that's no problem. 
Q. (BY MR. SILVESTER) Do you remember whether 
or not at the time the home was set on the 
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foundation, there were any checks done of the gas 
line? 
A. I don't know. I assumed Oakwood would when 
they set it up. The gas company, Summit Propane, 
supposedly put one. But I found out later Oakwood 
wasn't responsible, they just set it up. 
Q. And I probably didn't ask very good 
foundation questions, so let me make sure we got 
that clear. Were you there when the home was set on 
the foundation? 
A. I was there the day it got there and they 
pulled it over the foundations, and they still had 
to jack it together and put it up. And a couple of 
nights after work I stopped in as they was shutting 
down for the day, the setup crew, I talked to them a 
little bit. But the only time I was really around 
there was, you know, when the home initially arrived 
that day and after work, you know, they'd been 
working through the day and doing the jacking and 
blocking. 
Q. So I think you said just a minute ago that 
it was your understanding that Oakwood did not do 
any inspections or tests of the gas line. Is that 
what you testified to a minute ago? 
A. Once the home was delivered--
Associated Professional Reporters, 
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Right, 
--they didn't do any. 
How did you come to that understanding? 
Went through some paperwork that they'd 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
sent. 
Q. Was that paperwork that you went through 
after the explosion? 
A. Yes. 
MR. D'ELIA: Just for clarification, are 
you talking about the depositions and Answers to 
Interrogatories, things like that? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, uh huh. Yes. 
Q. (BY MR. SILVESTER) That helps, because my 
next question was going to be: Did you have 
paperwork available to you that you'd gotten 
delivered with the home? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That was another bad question. We all saw 
the site of the explosion and realized there was 
massive damage. I'm wondering if you were able to 
retrieve any of your paperwork from the explosion 
site? 
A. Most of the paperwork I retrieved I had to 
go get copies. Some was in my desk that some of the 
drawers didn't blow out, get blew out whole. There 
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was a little paperwork but not a lot. 
Q. Do you remember whether or not the 
paperwork you got out of your desk related to the 
home that you bought? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you remember what that paperwork 
was? 
A. It seemed like it was some of the paper, a 
contract, how much a month, and the insurance papers 
was there where Oakwood had insured the home. 
Q. What time did you leave the home the day of 
the accident? 
A. Approximately 6:15, 6:20. 
Q, And were you working for Geary Construction 
at the time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you at the gravel pit at the time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you work all day? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Tell us what happened after you finished 
work. 
A. Well, our plans for that afternoon when I 
got off work, was to meet my wife in town at four 
o'clock and from there we'd go to Park City and get 
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our grocery shopping done. That would save me a 1 
trip of going to home and back to Coalville. And I 1 
give them till 4:30, and when they didn't show I 1 
went home. 1 
Q, Where were you goinq to meet? 1 
A. At Geary's shop in Coalville. In town. 1 
MR. D'ELIA: If at any point in time, Bill, 1 
you want to take a break, you just tell us, we'll 1 
take a break. 1 
Q. (BY MR. SILVESTER) Yes. Absolutely. 1 
contact them by telephone? 1 
A. No. 1 
Q. You did have a telephone at the home at the 1 
time? 1 
A. Yes. I 
Q. And so you went back up Chalk Creek and up 1 
Clark Canyon. Correct? 1 
A. Yes. 1 
Q. And when you arrived, what did you see? 1 
A. I could see my house all—everything was 1 
all blew up and destroyed. 1 
Q. At the time you arrived was there any fire 1 
anywhere? 1 
A. Yes. 1 
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Q. And can you tell us where you saw fire? 
A. It was coming out of the propane line where 
it come out of the ground into the home. The flame 
was coming out burning there. 
Q. That's the area where the second stage 
regulator had been? 
A. Yes. Yeah. 
Q. What did you do when you arrived? 
A. When I first pulled up to where the corral 
in my old house is, I seen everything all blew up, 
and I don't know, I lost my mind. I seen a trail of 
yellow coming down the road and I thought, you know, 
it was a do not cross barrier like the authorities 
had been there. And I run in my old house to call 
the sheriff department to see if everybody was okay 
or whatnot, but the phone wouldn't work because it 
was on the same line as up to my new house, and the 
wires was melted together and the phone was out 
there. 
And so I, I don't know, my mind went 
completely crazy with what I saw and walked into, 
that I whirled around and beat it down the canyon to 
the nearest phone to see if my family was okay. And 
about halfway down the canyon my mind started 
telling me there's no tracks here. If something 
FAbL 3 3 
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1 like that there would be tracks here, people around, 
2 authorities would have been contacting me. But I 
3 was down the canyon committed far enough I had to go 
4 make a phone call to notify people and find out 
5 about my family. 
6 Q. Where did you go to make that call? 
7 A. I first stopped at the first house west of 
8 the gate on the main road, and nobody was home. And 
9 so I went down to the next home, nobody was home. 
10 And the next home the residence of Gerald Richins, 
11 they was home, is where I made the call. 
12 Q. And you called the county sheriff's 
13 department? 
14 A. We couldn't remember the number, and I 
15 think I'm the one that dialed 911 because they 
16 couldn't remember the number right offhand. And 
17 just dialed 911. I think that's what happened. 
18 Q. How long did you stay at the Richins? 
19 A. Long enough to find out that the accident 
20 hadn't been reported. And then I just threw them 
21 the telephone and went to look for my family. 
22 Q. When you got back there then, what did you 
23 do? 
24 A. I pulled right up as close as I could to 
25 the scene to stay out of the debris and whatnot, and 
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I was 100 feet or so down the hill. I first went up_ 
and I found my wife. And I took my coat off and( ?t/f ' 
over her. And then I walked out through the rubble 
past this flame and I found my daughter, and I took 
my shirt off and put over her. And I couldn't find 
our baby. And it was then when I was walking 
through the rubble and out looking for the baby, it 
dawned on me there's gases leaking and burning. And 
I walked over to the bottle and turned the valve off 
at the gas bottle at that time while I was looking 
for my boy. 
Q. Other than the flame that you saw where the 
piping was, was there any other area burning that 
you remember? 
A. There was it showed where things had burnt, 
but the fire had burnt itself out. You could see 
timbers and where the fire had been, but it was 
mainly the main line coming out which was burning. 
There was some walls and that you could tell where 
the electrical panels, all them had burnt themselves 
out in black ashes. 
Q. Were any of the walls on the home still 
standing when you first got there? 
A. No. 
Q. Were there any areas where the home had 
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moment, I want to know prior to moving into the 
home or after you moved into the home or any time 
prior to the explosion, someone from Oakwood told 
you that they would not do any-on-site inspection 
of the propane line, for example, to make sure that 
it was intact? 
A. Nobody said they wouldn't. But the 
question is it never arose. Say I assumed it was 
done. 
Q. And your belief to the contrary, does that 
come about from discussions you've had with Mr, 
D'Elia as well as responses to interrogatories that 
Oakwood has filed? Is that correct? 
A, Is--
Q. That you have read the responses to 
interrogatories of Oakwood, spoken with your 
attorney, and that's the basis, your sole basis, 
that the line may not have been inspected on site by 
Oakwood, Is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Again in keeping with my skipping around 
questioning here, I want to talk to you a little bit 
about the day of the explosion, My understanding is 
you were supposed to meet your wife at four to go 
shopping, 
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Yes. 
Q. And she didn't come, and you went home to 
check on her, Correct? 
A. Yes, 
Q, How far would it have been from the Geary 
shop, that's where you were waiting for her, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's right in Coalville? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What kind of a distance are we looking at 
between there and your home? 
A. Eleven miles. 
Q. Was there a phone available at the Geary 
shop? 
A. Not at the shop. There was phones 
available at my brother or gas station. 
Q, Is there a reason you chose not to call? 
A. The reason I chose not to call at the time, 
is my wife kept schedules down, she was there. 
I—it went through my mind on the way up the canyon 
that she run off the road in the bar ditch, she's 
stuck. You know, coming down the road, she's stuck, 
maybe the car wouldn't start, maybe she come out of 
the house, there was ice coming off thejbackboard,K 
maybe she slipped and fell, she got hurt. I know ) 
Associated Professional Reporters, 
143 
1 that I'll just find her in the road in a snowbank or 
2 something on the way. 
3 Q. Your oldest daughter was Tina? 
4 A. Yeah. 
5 Q, Did she go to school? 
6 A. Yes. 
1 Q, What time typically would she have left to 
8 go to school? 
9 A. I took her with me in the mornings down to 
10 the road and she caught the school bus. I took her 
11 with me. 
12. Q. What day of the week was the accident? 
13 A. Saturday. 
14 Q. That explains why she was off schedule? 
15. A. Yes. 
16 Q, I realize you don't know, but I would like 
17 to know if you have any theory or belief as to what 
18 might have caused this explosion. Based upon kind 
19 of the culmination of everything you know about 
20 living there, being there, looking at what occurred 
21 afterwards, you have a unique position to answer 
22 that question. And I would like you to, if you know 
23 or have any speculation, I'd like to know what that 
24 is. 
25 MR. D'ELIA: Could I just ask one question 
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with respect to what you've asked? Obviously 
there's a point of ignition, and then there's 
Are you something to do with how gas got out. 
asking one or both? 
MR. PLANT; Both. 
MR. D'ELIA: Thank you. 
Q. (BY MR. PLANT) Thank you. Do you have any 
idea, sir? 
A. Yes, I do. And this is totally my theory. 
I knew my wife and their daily schedule. When we 
found the clock it kind of put things into my mind 
what happened. 
Q. What time was the clock? I saw it but I 
just don't remember. 
A. 9:25 a.m. 
MR. D'ELIA: And that is here, for your 
information, in case you would like to see it again. 
MR. PLANT: I remember seeing that. I 
remember seeing that. 
THE WITNESS: At that time of day when 
I—when I got up at 5:30, put the coffee on, took my 
shower, when I got out of the shower my wife got up, 
fixed my lunch, and the baby was up with her and she 
was feeding him, 
Q. (BY MR. PLANT) The baby was 18 months old. 
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STATE OF UTAH 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
) 
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COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the deposition of WILLIAM G. 
ERCANBRACK, the witness in the foreqoinq deposition 
named, was taken before me, David A. Thacker, a 
Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in 
and for the State of Utah, residinq at Murray, Utah. 
That the said witness was by me, before examination, 
duly sworn to testify to the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothinq but the truth in said cause. 
That the testimony of said witness was reported by 
me in Stenotype, and thereafter caused by me to be 
transcribed into typewritinq, and that a full, true 
and correct transcription of said testimony so taken 
and transcribed is set forth in the foreqoing pages 
numbered from 3 to 175, inclusive, and said 
witnesses deposed and said as in the foregoing 
annexed deposition. 
I further certify that I am not of kin or otherwise 
associated with any of the parties to said cause of 
action, and that I am not interested in the event 
thereof. 
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake City, 
Utah, this 21st day of June 1999. 
DAVID A. THACKER, C.S.R. 
License No. 22-105417-7801 
My Commission Expires: 
August 1, 2002 
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P R O C E E D I R G S 
LYNN B. BORG, 
called as a witness for and on behalf of the 
Defendants SS Supply and Summit Propane, being first 
duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR, SILVESTER: 
Q. ttr. Borgf would you state your full name 
for the record, please. 
£.. lijnn B, Borg. 
Q. Ife've met before. I'm Fred Silvester, and 
I represent SS Supply and Sunnit Propane in this 
matter. 
tot is your present position? 
A. Chief toon Investigator of fie Stats Firs 
Ifazshal's office. 
Q. tod can you generally describe for us what 
your duties are? 
L Jo iavestigate fizm mi detemn© the 
cause aid origia on ta, asd take fches to eeait i f 
them's© iacendissj f i ras , w eaa datamiaa who did 
tea, and establish a ea3®. J feeaefe a lo t erf 
classes tlirenghmit the State of Utah. 
Q. What types of classes do you teach? 
g u e m& arson JHroatigation slassesv 
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Q. Did you have occasion to ask hia how often 
then the furnace would be used as opposed to the 
pellet stove? 
A. las, I did. 
Q. Do you remember anything about what he told 
you? 
A» He said he very, very seldom used the 
furnace after De-amber 23rd yhen the pellet stove 
was installed, bacause the pellet stove would keep 
the house real warm* So ha didn't use his furnace 
after that, It was used vary, very little, 
Q- Do you remember having any discussion with 
Mr. Ercanbrack about the first observations he made 
when he got to the house after the explosion? 
A. Ho. Because «hen I talked to him ha was 
still pretty traumatized. But he told me that he 
came up to the trailer house—he had gone to work 
that morning at six o'clock, was supposed to meat 
his wife and kids down in Coalville ahout four 
o1 clock in the afternoon, and they didn't show up* 
So he thought they had had problems with their 
vehicle, so he started back up to see if he could 
find them, locate the®, because they was going to go 
shopping for groceries. And be just told ma that 
when he got up to where he could see the trailer 
PAGS 22 
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house, it was all over the side of the mountain. 
And he went up and I think he told me he found his 
wife and the one little girl, if I can remember 
correctly. 
Q. Did Mr. Ercanbrack tell you that he 
actually left the scene, went and made telephone 
calls, before he then went back up to find his wife 
and daughter? 
A. I can remember he told ma that when he saw 
it he went down to the nearest house down the canyon 
and called in the situation. 
Q> Did he tell you that he went to the 
RichinsT house? Did he identify those people by 
name? 
A. I can't z&mbsx the nama of the people he 
told me, 
Q. Have you ever interviewed anyone who said 
that they were there when he called the fire 
department? 
A, Mo, I have not. 
Q. The 1st of February when you were on the 
scene, after the boy's body was recovered, do you 
recall noting any particular areas where there was 
major burning that had taken place? 
A. The whole inside of the trailer house had 
23 
1 bean bursal. Well, down underneath the steel 
2 framework. 
3 Q, Did you [sake any determination as to the 
4 fuel source for that burning? 
5 A. Feel source? 
6 Q. Yes. Was it the floor continuing to burn, 
7 was there gas in :hat area, did you make an/ 
8 determination? 
9 A. It was just the combustible loading that 
10 didn't get blown out of the trailer at the time of 
11 the explosion, You know, everything was pretty well 
12 burned-up that was left in there, 
13 Q. Did you also have occasion to look at the 
14 area where the oas line came out of the ground? 
15 A. Yes, l did, 
16 Q. tod what do you recall seeing at that area? 
17 A, It was 14 inches underneath the ground 
18 where the main line that came out of the propane 
19 tank, i t mmld have bean a yellow polyvinyl or 
20 polyuretbane half-inch line tied into approximately 
21 a six foot flax line that cama up to the north side 
22 of the trailer house, and would have tied into a 
23 secondary regulator right on the north end of the 
24 trailer house. 
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1 some sort of continuing burning in that area? 
2 A. M l , I talked to Bob Berry, and you could 
3 see the ead of i t was burnt badly. Share mm 
4 pieces of the secondary regulator laying iom on the 
5 ground, w&ch I didn11 bother because I kaetf ethsr 
5 people would want to examine that material. 
7 But when Sergeant Henley arrived, fa© was 
8 the first one to arrive on the fire scene from what 
9 I was told, fire was s t i l l coming out of that fleas 
10 line, three-quarter inch flex line, that tied 
11 into—would have tied into the secondary regulator. 
12 It was still burning, and Sergeant Henley turned the 
13 propaae off at the propane task. 
14 Q, Did Detective Berry give you any estimate 
15 of about what time of the dav that tank was turned 
16 off? 
17 L teective Berry told m that SQIES 
18 saowbilers clear across the valley on the south 
19 side I telieve i t was, yeah, i t would ha^a been the 
20 south side as you go up the frost of lie trai ler 
21 side' across the valley, saw smoke around eleven 
22 o'clock. Ihey determined— 
23 Q. My question was a little unclear, so let me 
24 ask again. 
23 A, Okay._ 
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Q. I'm wonderinq if he told you what time of 
the day Sergeant Henley turned the tank off? 
L t don't zsmsbsx exactly whea i t \m. I t 
awild km been shortly after 1705 wbaa they tsara 
notified of the f i r e and the explosion. So tbsy 
tmuld ham bean i m d i a t e l y responded tip there. 
Q. Okay. On that f i rs t day when you were on 
the scene, were you able to trace any more of the 
qas pipinq besides the piping that went from the 
tank to the trailer? 
A. Pie could see shore the ratal pipe had gauss 
underneath the fraas through tha eiaderblock wall 
slid b a d underneath tfhere the t r a i l e r house had 
been. Bat there was piaces of i t tha t were Biasing, 
and I didn' t pul l i t out. As a matter of fact, i t 
wasn't pulled out un t i l the Engineers ease up axtd 
resaved that pipe from, underneath the t r a i l e r . 
Q. Which was on the 4th? 
A. Ihat'B correct . 
Q. -I think you've actually recorded this both 
in diaqrams and photographs. But on the 1st of 
February you also t r ied to locate a l l of the 
gas-burning appliances. Is that correct? 
A. flora was only too of than. But yes, 1 did 
locate them. 
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Q. And that was the furnace and the stove? 
A. That's correct. 
MR. PLANT: Do you mind if I look to those 
photographs? 
THE WITNESS: No. Sure. Don't mix them 
up. 
MR. PLflNT: I won't. 
Q. (BI MR. SILVESTER) You trust a lawyer not 
to mix things up. 
You found the stove and the furnace on the 
1st February. Is that right? 
A, Sure. 
Q. And they weren't moved at all on that day. 
Is that correct? 
A. No, they ears not moved that day. A 
thay vsran't moved by m and I never saw anybody 
Q. Did you have any discussions with Detective 
Berry about whether or not either of those 
appliances had been moved in the body search the day 
before, or the evening before? 
A. Ho, they had not beea staved, that I can 
remember. 
Q. Did you have any discussions with Detective 
bar™ shnnt uhAi-hsr DT not ativ of the oiDina had to 
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be moved during the body recovery? 
A. He, I don't believe. Bseatiss the h&tiim 
wssQ—the l i t t l e g i r l was ea the south side of tea 
teailer house and the mother mxM have bees oa the 
west. So I don't think they is rod aay. I daa'fc 
recall h i i te l l ing m anything that they moved. 
Q. But at least with the Menta t ion that yon 
gathered, i t was your impression that neither the 
appliances nor the piping had been moved after the 
explosion? 
A. Ho. I don't thiak aaything w s moved. 
Because they mm called up there aad i t «as flight, 
so Tm sure they t r ied to praserro the scan© as best 
they could so they could do t h e i r investigation 
daring daylight hours, fhsfe's vhy I d idn ' t go up 
that night, because they d idn ' t want to t ry te de sa 
investigation i s the dark. 
Q. After Mr. Carling arrived, what assignment, 
if any, did you give ok? 
A. He just west around with m, because I gas 
trying to !ind aa ignitioa source that might have 
ignited that material, aad had Mr. Catling t e l l m 
i f he could dateradne what might have ignited that . 
Sad I ramembar Mr. Carling t a i l i n g m, I asked him 
shout the furnace, the p i l o t l i g h t . 
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a sealed combustion furnace. B© didn ' t knot? has 
that could have done i t . Sis stove, which ms about 
20 feet north of the t r a i l s ? house, had as 
electronic igni ter on i t , se yeu veulda' t hero ted a 
p i lo t l i gh t . And we couldn't determine exactly s?hat 
t?euld have ignited the propane dora underneath the 
house, ted X just had Mr. Carling explain ha« the 
propane tank socked, how the regulators «orked, hm 
far down the pressure was yedseed, asd things l ike 
Q. During that i n i t i a l investigation, did you 
or Mr. Carling reach any conclusions about where the 
gas had escaped the system? 
A. I would say, and Mr. Carling w u l d say slso 
bac&usa 1 was with him, tha t i t escaped underneath 
the t r a i l e r house. 
Q. That was an unclear question so I got an 
unclear answer. 
A. I'm sorry. 
Q. I'm wondering if you identified a piece of 
equipment, a piece of piping or regulator or 
anything in the propane "delivery system? 
I. fan exact iocatioa, so. 
Q. Okay. 
A. tod I never have s ines . 
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ft, M l , I m m , yois know, I vouli say titar 
debris oin page K G . 2 wag blowa alossr fca 100 p£ds 
than 100 fe»t. 
Q, And he said that he intended to talk with 
the fire marshal personnel. Did this qentleaaan 
ever, to the best of your knowledge, speak with you? 
&. Mo. Euh i&. So that'}* just sera of tfaa 
things that t thought I wondered about, you knoy. 
MR. D'ELIU: Thank you. I have nothing 
further, 
(Discussion held off the record,) 
(Whereupon7 at 1:15 p.m., the deposition 
was concluded.) 
—oooOooo---
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THIS IS TO CBWCmrV titans t h e dvapoaifeiaa fc£ L f^cM E. 
BORG, tthe witness in. th« foregoing d e p o s i t i o n nftmeid, 
UBA taken. be£t3tfc& iw», Q#vid A. SX&acKer, & 0 8 £ t i r i e d 
dhoirrhasid fc£»po£,e«&A? »**«£ Notary Public? in (Mid £ttir feho 
Stat© of Utah, r es id ing a t Murcay, Utah. 
xhat -che aaid witness was by me, bo t a r e anamination, 
aciy swoun to tss t isry to the tEutn , the u h o i t tinach* 
and nothing but efaa t ru th LA said cause . 
t h a t the. t e s t i m o n y of. 3&id winnows W»JJ rvpaxxMd by 
BKa i n Srcmorypa , and thcjErcagftcte? C4»u3»d b y rae tio bo 
CttCtftacSribad i n t o t y p e w r i t i n g , and that ; & £ u X i , tzru<4 
&nd correc t t r a n s c r i p t i o n OK sa id testimony so eak»n 
#nd t ranscr ibed i s se t for th l a the forego m a pe^es 
nu&bariud from 4 t o 1G5, i n c l u s i v e , and s c a d 
witnesses d&posfcd and said as i n the foregoing 
2imexed depos i t ion , 
X ius ther c&rti£y t ha t I am not of kin or otherwise 
aweoaiaicad w i t h any of t h e pa.** u i a a eo a-aidL eaiiaia a£ 
cictxoxi; and Lhiit I cua. no t diiVttscitfaitjqEd i n "titui? <yv©ntS 
t n e r e o C . 
WITNESS MY HAND and a r t l c l a l s e a l a t Sa l t Laiie City, 
Utah, t h i s 2$fch day o$ July 1599, 
License Ho. 22-105417-7801 
My Coioiuxsaion JSKpiraa: 
Kugust U 2002 
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DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
UTAH STATE FIRE MARSHAL'S OFFICE 
R E P O R T O F I N V E S T I G A T I O N 
CASE FILE #: 98511 
REQUESTING AGENCY: Summit County Sheriffs Office ^ • " " " " " " ^ 
OWNER OR INSURED: Bill Ercanbrack 
OCCUPANT OR TENANT: Mr. and Mrs. Bill Ercanbrack and Family 
DATE OF LOSS: January 31, 1998 
TIME OF LOSS: Between 0600 and 1100 
LOCATION OF LOSS: Chalk creek Canyon 
COUNTY OF LOSS: Summit County 
ORIGIN OF LOSS: Accidental 
TYPE OF BUILDING: Double wide Trailer house 
RESPONDING FIRE DEFT.: Coalville Volunteer Fire Department 
EXAMINATION DATE: February 1, 1998 
SYNOPSIS: 
At approximately 1700, on January 31, 1998, a fire/explosion was reported at the home of Mr. 
and Mrs. Bill Ercanbrack. The home was located approximately eight miles up Chalk creek 
Canyon. Chalk creek Canyon is the canyon east of Coalville, Utah. Coalville Volunteer Fire 
Department responded to the fire/explosion that occurred in a double wide trailer but there was 
virtually nothing remaining because there had been an explosion prior to the fire. The explosion 
tore the entire trailer house to pieces spreading the trailer house in every direction. The fire 
completely consumed all of the combustible materials that remained in the trailer house after the 
explosion. Mr. Bill Ercanbrack left for work at approximately 0600, on January 31, 1998. After 
FM000001 
work Mr. Ercanbrack was going to meet his wife and children at 1600 hours in Coalville. 
Mr.Ercanbrack waited for approximately thirty minutes in Coalville and then decided that his 
wife and family had car trouble so he decided to head up Chalk Creek Canyon to look for his 
family. When he arrived home, he discovered the fire/explosion and his deceased wife and 
deceased daughter. J^&canbrack wSn^^rthrcanyon to the nearest home'lffd^reported tITe 
J k d ^ 1705 hours. Summit County Sheriffs Deputies and Coalville Fire 
i
^^^^l'^p^^
 t0 (-kg SCene. At approximately 1900 hours, Summit County Sheriffs 
Dispatcher telephonically notified me of the incident. Due to darkness I made arrangement to 
meet Summit County Sheriff Detective Rob Berry the following morning in Park City at the 
Sheriffs Office. On February 1, 1998, I met Rob and we proceeded to the fire/explosion scene. 
Initial examination determined that there had been an extensive LPG explosion. The trailer house 
was completely destroyed by the explosion. There were pieces of the trailer house spread in every 
direction with some of the debris being approximately one hundred yards away from where the 
trailer initially set. Detective Berry, informed me that Mrs. Ercanbrack and seven year old Tina 
Ercanbrack had died as a result of the fire/explosion and their bodies had been recovered the night 
of January 31, 1998. Detective Berry further informed me that eighteen month old, Jeremy had 
not been found. At approximately 0900 hours on February 1, 1998, Salt Lake County Sheriffs 
K-9 unit arrived with a search dog. The dog was released into the fire/explosion scene and shortly 
thereafter the burned body of Jeremy was located and recovered by the State Medical Examiner. 
Investigation into the fire/explosion scene determined that the fire/explosion was a result of LPG 
under the trailer house. The LPG built up under the trailer house until it found an ignition source 
and then the LPG blew up causing the fire/explosion. As a result of the fire/explosion three 
members of Ercanbrack family died and the double wide trailer house was totally destroyed. 
DETAILS: 
Investigation in this case is based upon information telephonically received on January 31, 1998, 
from the Summit County Sheriffs Office Dispatcher (Nancy). At approximately 1705* hour?, 
Nancy telephonically advised me at my residence, that a fire/explosion had occurred earlier duringf 
IJhgday. The fire/explosion had occurred'up Chalk Creek Canyon in a dwelling and there were 
three deceased people as a result of the fire/explosion. Nancy advised me that Detective Rob 
Berry had requested that I come to the scene and assist with the investigation. Due to darkness 
Detective Berry and myself decided it would be better to begin the investigation the following 
morning. On February 1, 1998, at approximately 0745,1 met Detective Berry in Park City at the 
Summit County Sheriffs Office. Detective Berry and myself immediately drove to Coalville and 
then up Chalk Creek Canyon for approximately eight miles to the scene of the fire/explosion. 
Summit County Sheriffs Office had a command vehicle at the scene and had maintained control 
of the fire/explosion scene during the night. As we approached the fire/explosion scene there was 
fiberglass insulation, boards and other debris along both sides of the dirt road, south of the trailer 
house for approximately one hundred yards. Arriving at the top of the hill where the trailer 
house had set, it was obvious that there was debris spread over the top of the entire hill. The 
debris from the trailer house had blown every direction. There was insulation and debris in the 
top of quakenaspen trees north of the trailer and there was debris spread clear to the bottom of the 
hill that the trailer house had set upon. The front of the trailer house had faced south looking 
down a long canyon. Directly in front of the trailer house the mountain dropped off very steeply. 
The east side of the trailer house set on the end of the hill and there were no windows or doors 
in the east end of the trailer. The north side of the trailer house set on the side of the hill facing 
north up the canyon. There were numerous quakenaspen trees directly north of the trailer house. 
On the west end of the trailer house there was a door leading out onto a wooden deck and out to 
the gravel road and parking area. There were several of the Ercanbracks vehicles parked in the 
parking lot northeast of the trailer house. There was also a five hundred gallon LPG tank and a 
shed in the parking lot just northeast of the trailer house. The trailer house was twenty eight feet 
wide and forty eight feet long. The trailer house set on the hill facing south with the length of the 
trailer extending east to west. The trailer house was purchase through Oakwood Sales, located 
at 3780 South, Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Utah. The trailer house was a model BOM, 3515, 
1997, Serial # HOCO15F01973. The walls of the trailer house were two by sixes with fiberglass 
insulation. The attic had cellulose insulation sprayed throughout the Attic area. Under the floor 
of the trailer house there was eight inch thick battings of fiberglass insulation covered with black 
plastic. Mr. Ercanbrack stated that the trailer house had been purchased on June 26, 1997 and 
had been delivered later during the summer. Mr. Ercanbrack stated that he graded the top of the 
mountain level and then he poured concrete footings for the trailer house to set on. Tae trailer. 
house was sitting on metal jacks. The metal jacks set on the concrete footings and the top of the 
jacks were under the steel beams that the trailer house was built on. The jacks were used to level 
the trailer house and keep the trailer house up off of the ground, approximately two and one half 
feet. Mr. Ercanbrack had built a four foot cinder block wall around the entire trailer house. Mr. 
Ercanbrack said he built the cinder block wall around the trailer instead of using aluminum 
skirting. Mr. Ercanbrack said this was going to be his home forever and he wanted to do it right. 
Mr.Ercanbrack said he placed molding between the cinder block wall and the trailer so rodents 
and bugs could not get under the trailer house. Mr.Ercanbrack stated that he also placed four 
ventilation screens on the north side of the cinder block wall and four screens on the south side. 
The screens were aluminum frames with metal sliders so the screens could be opened and closed. 
The cinder block wall around the entire trailer house was blown over during the explosion. There 
were sections of the cinder block wall eight feet away from the east end of the trailer house after 
the fire/explosion. Mr.Ercanbrack further stated that he had built a small roof structure over the 
secondary LPG regulator located on the north side of the trailer house, Mr.Ercanbrack said that 
he built the roof structure over the regulator so snow and ice would not slide off of the roof and 
break or damage the regulator. Mr. Ercanbrack had a metal roof installed on the trailer house 
after the trailer house had been delivered. Mr, Ercanbrack stated he did not want to have to worry 
about snow building up on the roof. When Mr.Ercanbrack ordered the trailer house he had the 
roof structure upgraded to an eighty pound roof because of the heavy snow where the trailer would 
be located. The furnace and kitchen stove inside of the trailer house burned LPG. The furnace 
was located in the kitchen toward the west end of the trailer house. The furnace was equipped 
with a pilot light that remained burning at all times. The LPG stove was located against the north 
wall of the kitchen and used an electronic ignitor to light the burners. These were the only two 
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appliances that used LPG inside of the trailer house. Investigation determined that all of the 
control knobs for the stove were in the off position after the fire/explosion. The main gas 
connection for the trailer house was located under the trailer house on the north side toward the 
west end of the trailer house. The LPG tank was located approximately twenty feet northeast of 
the trailer house with an underground line leading from the five hundred gallon tank to the LPG 
connection located on the north side of the trailer house. The flexible line come up out of the 
ground where there was a secondary regulator that reduced the gas pressure inside of the trailer 
house to approximately eight ounces,or eleven inches of water column. The secondary regulator 
was destroyed by the fire/explosion. The only part of the regulator that remains is the orifice 
that is still hooked to the end of the flex pipe between the tank and the end of the underground 
line. The are pieces of the secondary regulator and molten metal on the ground directly below 
the area where the secondary regulator was located. 
Mr.Ercanbrack stated that he had got up around 0530 hours, on January 31, 1998, and was getting 
ready for work. He stated that he put a pot of coffee on the stove. When the burner ignited, 
Mr.Ercanbrack stated that the flame came up around the coffee pot further that it normally did. 
He said the flame was blue and not yellow or orange. He said he turned the other burners on and 
.everything seemed to be normal. He said he slid the coffee pot back a little ways so the handle 
would not get hot and burn his hand. Mr.Ercanbrack said the flame did not blacken the sides of 
the coffee pot. Mr.Ercanbrack stated that he did not smell anything and he did not smell gas or 
hear anything wrong before he left for work at approximately 0600 hours. Mr.Ercnabrack told 
me that he had never had any LPG problems in the past with the furnace or the stove. 
Mr.Ercanbrack said that the furnace never comes on because he heats the house with a wood 
burning pellet stove. He said the stove keeps the trailer house very warm so the furnace never 
turns on. Mr.Ercanbrack stated that the wood burning stove was installed on December 23, 1997. 
Mr.Ercanbrack stated that he had the five hundred gallon LPG tank filled August 7, 1997, and 
just a couple of days after installing the wood burning stove he checked the five hundred gallon 
L.P.G. tank and it was approximately sixty six percent full. Examination of the wood burning 
pellet stove determined that the on/off switch was in the off position, the fuel knob was in the "0" 
position and the fan knob was in the low position. On February 1, 1998, the liquid level gauge 
read approximately forty two percent full. The five hundred gallon tank did not sustain any fire 
or explosion damage. When I examined the tank on February 1, 1998, it was still covered with 
snow up to approximately the three quarter mark on the tank. The cover for the liquid level 
gauge on top of the tank was still intact and in good condition. 
Initial investigation before entering the trailer house showed that there was no flooring , walls, 
or roof structure left inside of the trailer house. All that remained structurally of the trailer house 
was the steel framework that the trailer house was built on. The steel framework that remained 
was bent and distorted from the fire/explosion. Inside of the trailer house there was still the 
bumed remains of the hot water heater, the furnace, two refrigerators,metal roofing and assorted 
other debris. The LPG stove and the wood burning pellet stove were completely blown out of the 
Trailer house. The LPG stove and the pellet stove were sitting in the snow approximately twenty 
feet north of the trailer house. The LPG stove is not bulged as if it had contained gas vapors and 
exploded. 
Before I entered the trailer house, the Salt Lake County Sheriffs K-9, unit arrived. The K-9 unit 
was called in because eighteen month old Jeremy Ercanbrack had not been found. The dog was 
released into the trailer house and approximately ten to fifteen minutes later the dog found the 
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burned remains of Jeremy. The State Medical Examiner entered the trailer house ajid removed 
Jeremys burned body. The State Medical Examiner and members of the Summit County Sheriffs 
Office and Fire Personnel removed the body of Mrs. Ercanbrack and daughter, seven year old 
Tina the night of January 31, 1998. Mrs. Erbrackenbracks body was located partially under the 
wooden deck located on the west side of the trailer house. Tinas body was located approximately 
in the middle of the trailer house along the south wall. 
Investigation determined that all of the appliances inside of the trailer were electric except the 
kitchen stove and the furnace. Just inside of the west door to the trailer house was the washer and 
dryer. Mr.Ercanbrack told Detective Berry that he had vented the electric dryer out underneath 
the floor of the trailer house. 
Mr. Ray Carling who is a member of the Utah State Liquefied Petroleum Gas Board, traveled to 
the fire/explosion scene at my request. Mr. Carling has worked in the LPG business for many 
years and I felt he would be a real asset to have on the scene. Ray examined the fire/explosion 
scene and agreed that the fire/explosion occurred from LPG under the trailer house. Mr. Carling 
is authoring a report and his report will be attached to this report. Mr.Bruce Rigby, from 
Summit Propane, out of Coalvillle, Utah was at the fire/explosion scene. I spoke to Mr. Rigby, 
and he informed me that Summit Propane had installed the five hundred gallon LPG tank, the 
underground line and the secondary regulator up to the north side of the trailer house. Mr. Rigby 
stated that they did not hook the LPG line to the trailer house. Mr. Rigby further stated that they 
conducted a pressure test on the system and insured that there were no leaks before leaving the 
site. Mr. Rigby confirmed that Summit Propane did indeed fill the five hundred gallon LPG tank 
on August 7, 1998. Mr. Rigby showed me a log book confirming when the LPG tank was filled. 
The tank was filled to eighty five percent or four hundred and twenty five gallons according to 
Mr. Rigby. 
It appears that the fire/explosion occurred between 0600 and 1100 hours on January 31, 1998. 
Mr. Ercanbrack departed the trailer house at approximately 0600 and everything appeared to be 
proper. At approximately 1100 hours some snow mobilers across the valley south of the trailer 
house saw smoke. Detective Berry interviewed the snow mobilers and may have further 
information. 
Before leaving the fire/explosion scene I removed the LPG steel pipe from the back of the LPG 
stove. The reason I removed the pipe was to have the pipe and pipe threads tested. 
CONCLUSION: 
It appears to this investigator that this fire is of accidental origin. It appears that sometime 
between 0600 and 1100 hours on January 31, 1998, enough LPG accumulated under the trailer 
house to reach its flammable limits (between 2.15% lower limit and 9.6% upper limit) and an 
ignition source came together. The result was a fire/explosion that completely destroyed the 
double wide trailer house and caused three people to loose their lives. I could not determine 
where the LPG leak came from however further investigation and testing will be conducted by 
engineers, LPG personnel, attorneys and other agencies and companies. 
FM000005 
Lynn B. Borg 
Fire Investigator 
FM000006 
I I 1 A- l 
8 B-l 
> — — 
II ' 1 1 50 ! I ,0 J J 
7f 
Ba- li i L 
O O 
o 
o 
o 
AY-b 3/4" 
INLET 
GAS 
1(Z>V4 -
FURN. 
10 M BTU 
36" RI5ER 
X-OvER 
fe UJ/H 
3 V 34 t1 BTU 
24' RISER 
RANGE 
bA n BID 
3fc- RISER 
o 
o> 
o 
o 
O 
OO 
1. AL f oourau wvf i 
1 AC KXTURf 4 KiVf A 
iiUtCFF VM.V2 
© OAKWOO© fiflOMES COMJPi / ©MASTING SE1VBCES UEffT. 7800 UcClOUO R0. GREENSBORO, HC. 27425 (910) 66A-2400 
0MAWW6 
lute 
OfuwiHO f»tc MonuAimi 
yo*-0m COLUMN J0<Z>M BTU (MAX; 
IBB BTU A6 &HOWN 
GAS PLUMBING 
j DRAWH IT L 
COLORADO H\5 I KA URlCHF 
NATIONAL 
/ - i 4 9 ' 
PIPE LEGE* 
3, 
1, 
O 1/2" RIS 
• 3/4" RIS 
BOM-3511 
1 2 - 1 6 - 9 6 
WT 0 1 - 1 3 - 9 
Exhibit 6 
UTRRCPRule36 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 36 
Page 1 
WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART V. DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY 
Copr. © West Group 2003. All rights reserved. 
Current with amendments received through 10-01-03 
RULE 36. REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 
(a) Request for Admission. 
(1) A party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission, for purpose of the pending action 
only, of the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request that relate to statements or 
opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact, including the genuineness of any documents described in the 
request. The request for admission shall contain a notice advising the party to whom the request is made that, 
pursuant to Rule 36, the matters shall be deemed admitted unless said request is responded to within 30 days after 
service of the request or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow. Copies of documents shall be 
served with the request unless they have been or are otherwise furnished or made available for inspection and 
copying. Without leave of court or written stipulation, requests for admission may not be served before the time 
specified in Rule 26(d). 
(2) Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set forth. The matter is admitted unless, 
within thirty days after service of the request, or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the 
party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection 
addressed to the matter, signed by the party or by his attorney, but, unless the court shortens the time, a defendant 
shall not be required to serve answers or objections before the expiration of 45 days after service of the summons 
and complaint upon him. If objection is made, the reasons therefor shall be stated. The answer shall specifically 
deny the matter or set forth in detail the reasons why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny the 
matter. A denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a 
party qualify his answer or deny only a part of the matter of which an admission is requested, he shall specify so 
much of it as is true and qualify or deny the remainder. An answering party may not give lack of information or 
knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny unless he states that he has made reasonable inquiry and that the 
information known or readily obtainable by him is insufficient to enable him to admit or deny. A party who 
considers that a matter of which an admission has been requested presents a genuine issue for trial may not, on that 
ground alone, object to the request; he may, subject to the provisions of Rule 37(c), deny the matter or set forth 
reasons why he cannot admit or deny it. 
(3) The party who has requested the admissions may move to determine the sufficiency of the answers or 
objections. Unless the court determines that an objection is justified, it shall order that an answer be served. If the 
court determines that an answer does not comply with the requirements of this rule, it may order either that the 
matter is admitted or that an amended answer be served. The court may, in lieu of these orders, determine that final 
disposition of the request be made at a pretrial conference or at a designated time prior to trial. The provisions of 
Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. 
(b) Effect of Admission. Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on 
motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. Subject to the provisions of Rule 16 governing 
amendment of a pretrial order, the court may permit withdrawal or amendment when the presentation of the merits 
of the action will be subserved thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that 
withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits. Any admission 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 36 
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made by a party under this rule is for the purpose of the pending action only and is not an admission by him for any 
other purpose nor may it be used against him in any other proceeding. 
[Amended effective November 1, 1999.] 
Advisory Committee Note 
For a complete explanation of the 1999 amendments to this rule and the interrelationship of these amendments 
with the other discovery changes, see the advisory committee note appended to Rule 26. The Supreme Court order 
approving the amendments directed that the new procedures be applicable only to cases filed on or after November 
1, 1999. 
Rules Civ. Proa, Rule 36 
UT R RCP Rule 36 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART VI. TRIALS 
Copr. © West Group 2003. All rights reserved. 
Current with amendments received through 10-01-03 
RULE 50. MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AND FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT 
(a) Motion for Directed Verdict; When Made; Effect. A party who moves for a directed verdict at the close 
of the offer evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without 
having reserved the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. A motion for a 
directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have 
moved for directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific ground(s) therefor. The order 
of the court granting a motion for a directed verdict is effective without any assent of the jury. 
(b) Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the 
close of all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action 
to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. Not later than ten days after 
entry of judgment, a party who has moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment 
entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict; or if a 
verdict was not returned such party, within ten days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in 
accordance with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial may be joined with this motion, or a 
new trial may be prayed for in the alternative. If a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to stand 
or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict 
had been directed. If no verdict was returned the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict 
had been directed or may order a new trial. 
(c) Same: Conditional Rulings on Grant of Motion. 
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided for in Subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, 
the court shall also rule on the motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be granted if the 
judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify the grounds for granting or denying the motion for a 
new trial. If the motion for a new trial is thus conditionally granted, the order thereon does not affect the finality of 
the judgment. In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on 
appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered. In case the motion for a new 
trial has been conditionally denied, the respondent on appeal may assert error in that denial; and if the judgment is 
reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in accordance with the order of the appellate court. 
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may serve a 
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 not later than ten days after entry of the judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. 
(d) Same: Denial of Motion. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is denied, the party who 
prevailed on that motion may, as respondent, assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in the event the appellate 
court concludes that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. If the 
appellate court reverses the judgment, nothing in this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is 
entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court to determine whether a new trial shall be granted. 
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RULE 103. RULINGS ON EVIDENCE 
(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence 
unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of 
record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of Proof In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to 
the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked. Once the court makes a 
definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an 
objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal. 
(b) Record of Offer and Ruling. The court may add any other or further statement which shows the character of 
the evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the 
making of an offer in question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of Jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent 
inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof 
or asking questions in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain Error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although 
they were not brought to the attention of the court. 
[Amended effective November 1, 2001.] 
Advisory Committee Note 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. The 2001 amendment adopts changes made in Federal Rule of Evidence 
103(a) effective December 1, 2000. 
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Copr. © West Group 2003. All rights reserved. 
Current with amendments received through 10-01-03 
RULE 702. TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Advisory Committee Note 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. Rule 56(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), was substantially the same. 
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RULE 703. BASES OF OPINION TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those 
perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts 
in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in 
evidence. 
Advisory Committee Note 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and expands Rule 56(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), which limited 
facts or data not personally known to the expert to those made known to him at the hearing. The provision that the 
facts or data upon which the expert relies for his opinion in a particular field may be of the type "reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions," and need not otherwise be admissible also seems to 
expand Rule 56(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). But see Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974). Recent 
Utah cases have tended towards recognition of the position taken by this rule. Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 
1328 (Utah 1979); Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641 (Utah 1980); State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1982). 
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1 or does the pipe collar with the chasers spin? 
2 A. No, the pipe spins and the dye stays stationary, 
3 Q. Okay. And if in fact a pipe is coming through the 
4 chaser and gets to the end, when it's being threaded, it gets 
5 to the end of the chaser if, in fact, the die is not released 
6 at that point quickly, what happens? 
7 A. It will continue to make threads. For every turn you 
8 have of the pipe, you have one additional thread. 
9 Q. Okay. Now, regarding your actual theory, you start 
10 with a particular point in order to determine what occurred 
11 from a failure analysis standpoint of view; right? 
12 MR. PLANT: It is leading, Your Honor. 
13 MR. D'ELIA: Just to the point — 
14 THE COURT: I'll allow it. 
15 THE WITNESS: Well, first of all, recognize that 
16 youTd have to take the conditions surrounding the failure, and 
17 you have to try to determine what happened based upon those. 
18 Number one, we know we had gas under the trailer that caused 
19 an explosion. Okay, number two, assuming the gas came from a 
20 source under the trailer 100 percent had to be one of the 
21 three broken pipes. 
22 Q. Okay. 
23 A. Okay. 
24 Q. Now, you rely upon Dr. Romig and Mr. Thatcher for the 
25 fact that the gas could not have come under the trailer from 
Carlton Way, Registered Professional Reporter 
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an outside leak; is that correct? 
A. As far as them being gas, yes, I do. 
Q. Are there any fracture analysis or failure analysis 
type of opinions that also assist you in making such a 
conclusion? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What? 
A. Well, first of all, if it did come from the outside, 
you have to have conditions being met: The one condition I 
won't go ahead and say I'm an expert at because that's a 
passage of the gas into the building. I won't even talk about 
that. 
But the other condition you had to have a dramatic 
failure of the outside part, either the regulator or pipe or 
something like that. 
Q. And do you hve evidence of anything like that 
occurring? 
A. No. 
Q. Now, do you also rely upon Mr. Thatcher's opinion 
that the thread leak could not have caused a — or 
significantly contributed to the explosion? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Starting at that point now, you then take a look and 
you've narrowed it down to the three fractures --
A, Okay, you have three fractures --
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scenario as to how much force it would take if only one of the 
range risers was inserted; correct? 
A. That's right. 
Q. What's another scenerio? 
A. We went ahead as well as inserting the one range 
riser, we went ahead and fixed the point where the pipe would 
normally come out of the trailer. 
Q. Is that where I am pointing right now? 
A. Right. 
Q. What did you do with that? 
A. If you actually put that into place someplace --
Q. Put this into place? 
A. Right. Then you try to slide the other end one and 
five sixteenth of an inch. It takes — we had a load 
equivalent to 70pounds, and we exceeded that. So it took far 
in excess of 70-pounds to put it into place. 
Q. Okay. And you were saying that it takes in excess of 
70 pounds? 
A. Yes, far in excess. 
Q. Were you able to gauge some kind of an approximate 
specific gauge as to how much force would be placed on that? 
A. . Oh, I would say between eighty and a hundred pounds. 
Q. Between eighty and a hundred? 
A. Right. 
Q. And how much force did it take to break the 
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over-threaded and under-inserted range riser? 
A. Eighty. 
Q. Okay. Did you make any calculations or any opinions 
with respect to what is the weakest pipe in the system? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Which one? 
A. Well, very obviously the weakest joint — I'd say the 
weakest part is where the pipe goes into the elbow on the 
range riser. 
Q. Is that from what you were explaining before of the 
over-threading and over-insertion? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Based upon your observations, were you able to form a 
conclusion at that point in time as to where the leak occurred 
from to cause the explosion in the Ercanbrack home? 
A, Yes. 
Q. What? 
THE COURT: Wait a minute. 
MR. PLANT: Object, now. That has absolutely no 
foundation whatsoever or evidence that it leaked, and this 
calls for sure speculation. 
MR. D'ELIA: He's already said that he relies upon 
everyone else, the leak had to occur underneath the crawl 
space — 
MR. PLANT: Your Honor, the — the objection is 
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